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Preface 
Thts study is an examination of the historical development of 
Japanese resource policy during the post-war period; from the early 
1950s to the early 1970s. As a resource-poor country, Japan has been 
dependent on imports through foreign companies for nearly all fuel and 
mineral resources. That is, Japan has been vulnerable to potential 
resource shortages, supply suspensions or price increases, any of which 
would hinder economic activities. Thus, in the 1960s, a resource policy 
for the purpose of ensuring supplies from Japanese-controlled sources 
became an integral part of Japanese foreign economic policy. Japanese 
resource policy development was the result of a conscious and deliberate 
effort on the part 
. 
of the Japanese government 
. 
and private corporations. 
This paper focuses on the Japanese political and economic 
structure_ within which resource policy was devised and implemented. The 
integrated po11c1es of both the Japanese government and private Japanese 
corporations were formulated through close relations between both the 
government and extractive industry firms. The government role was 
especially significant in determining the orientation and implementation 
of policy. Government supportive measures included financial and 
technical _assistance to the extractive corporations and economic aid to 
producing countries. 
To provide context, policy development was also examined in light 
of industrialization·, the changing international resource situation, and 
the growing strength of the Japanese economy. The increase� economic 
capability of the Japanese participants, in terms of capital and 
technology, enabled them to embark on more active resource policies. A 
power shift between the international oil and mineral industries and 
producing countries also provided favorable conditions for Japanese 
resource policy. These international and domestic factors 
vii 
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contributed to the evolution of Japanese resource policy, from a passive 
and domestic orientation to a more active and "autonomous" one. 
Finally, the paper examines the policy strategies of the 
government and the extractive corporations in Japanese resource ventures 
in the Southeast Asian countries {Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia, 
Thailand and Burma), encompassing both energy sources {petroleum and 
LNG) and non-ferrous minerals {copper, nickel and bauxite). The case 
studies support the argument that the development of Japanese resource 
policy is exemplified by conscious policies devised ·through close 
government and private industry cooperation. 
* * * * 
This volume has its origins in my M.A. thesis submitted to Cornell 
University in 1982. Preparing a manuscript requires the personal 
support and assistance of many. Professor T. J. Pempel, as the chairman 
of my graduate conwnittee, has always offered valuable guidance and 
advice, from which I have learned a great deal. Professor Benedict G. 
Anderson, the other member of the convnittee, read the manuscript and 
gave me helpful co11111ents. I owe a debt to Professor Peter Katzenstein 
for his insightful remarks which helped me formulate the project. 
I am also grateful to many friends in Ithaca, especially Martin 
Kenney, whose h�lp and suggestions were essential in completing the 
original thesis. Finally, particular gratitude is owed to my mother and 
sister in Tokyo and my late father who gave me sincere support at all 
times. I thank all of these persons for their help and support.. 
• 
Shoko Tanaka 
Ithaca, New York 
May 1986 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the period since World War II Japan has achieved 
spectacular economic progress and become a world economic power. Many 
international and domestic factors contributed to this economic growth. 
High private investment, a well-educated and skilled work force, far­
sighted governaent economic policies and favorable international 
political and economic conditions are but a few of the factors which 
combined to contribute to Japan's growing economic strength. To 
accomplish this amazing expansion, resource-deficient Japan has had to 
import nearly all the fuel and mineral resources it has used for 
industrial production. 
The White Paper of the Ministry of International Trade and 
Industry (MITI) states: 
The unavailability of energy and natural resources 
would result in costly economic disturbances 
including a rise in unemployment, low economic 
growth, and an austere life style . . t. .  Guaranteeing
economic security by securing stable energy and 
resource supplies has been indispensable for economic 
welfare as well as for a long-term effective economy
in Japan (MITI, 1980 p. 246). 
As a resource-poor country, Japan has been vulnerable to potential 
resource shortages, supply suspensions or price increases, any of which 
would hinder economic activities. Thus, for the Japanese government and 
industry securing stable, low-cost resource supplies has been a major 
concern. A resource policy designed to ensure such supplies has been an 
integral part of Japanese foreign economic policy. 
A number of authors have examined Japanese resource policy, 
especially with regard to energy sources (Morse, 1981a, 1981b; Okita, 
1978; Wu, 1977). The most common argument is that an active Japanese 
resource policy 1s a recent phenomenon begun in the 1970s in response to 
1 
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the 1973 Arab 011 Embargo, the so-called "oil crisis" and the subsequent 
oil price increases. This interpretation places the emphasis for 
Japan's active resource policy on independent "resource diplomacy'' 
between Japan and the oil producing countries in the Middle East. Such 
an independent energy policy is said to be causing discord between Japan 
and the Western nations, especially the U.S. (Caldwell, 1981). 
This paper seeks to investigate the historical development 0f 
Japanese resource policy period since World War 11,' arguing against 
those who perceive that policy as a recent phenomenon. Resource 
diplomacy with the Middle Eastern countries did become particularly 
. . 
active after the oil crises; however, it was not the first product of . . 
the Japanese government's resource policy in response to instability in 
oil supplies. Japanese resource policy began well before the oil 
crisis, and was not the result of reactions to abrupt events. Instead 
they represented a series of conscious efforts by the Japanese 
government and private corporations to achieve greater independence in 
regard to overseas·resource extraction. Furthermore, Japanese resource 
policy has not been confined to oil; it also encompasses other minerals. 
To look only at Japanese energy policy, especially toward the Middle 
East after the oil crisis, ignores the integrated evolution of Japanese 
resource policy as it �as _been conducted by the government and private 
companies. Even before the oil crisis Japanese resource policy had been 
implemented not only in the Middle East but also in other parts of the 
world. This study delineates policy developments in the period from the 
end of the Second World War until the mid 1970s, when the oil crisis 
began to affect the policy. 
This paper examines policy evolution in terms of the Japanese 
political and economic structures within which it has been devised and 
implemented. The close relations between the Japanese government and 
extractive industries have a genealogy and ·histo.ry determined by 
government policies and the industrial structure of the oil and mineral 
companies. Moreover, while early developments may have occurred in a 
, 
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relatively isolated, national context, later events must be seen in 
light of the internationalization of the Japanese economy, due to the 
economy's growing strength and the changing international resource 
situation. This explanation of Japanese resource policy is supported by 
a more detailed examination of Japanese actions in Southeast Asia. 
The first section describes the general importance of resource 
policy and its connection to the foreign economic policies of 
industrialized nations. The emergence of multinational oil and mineral 
companies in the Western industrial countries and government policies to 
pr�tect them suggests the inseparability of government resource and 
foreign economic p�licies. For Japan, which lacks a domestic resource 
supply and has no mining industries comparable to the international 
resource companies, the resource question has been a particularly 
important concern of foreign economic policy. Understanding Japanese 
resource policy also requires an examination of the politico-economic 
structure of Japanese society, more specifically the government's 
intimate interaction with private extractive industries. Furthermore, 
attention is also given to those features of the domestic and 
international economy which enabled the Japanese government and private 
corporations to pursue increasingly nationalistic policies so as to 
secure access to foreign supplies. 
The second section discusses the importance of resources for the 
Japanese economy. The significance of resources is highlighted by the 
changing structure of'Japanese industry and the composition of its 
national trade. Several special characteristics of Japan's resource 
situation induced the Japanese government and Japanese corporations to 
shift from passive resource policies to more active and independent 
ones. The structure of supply and the consumption of resources were 
particularly important in this regard. 
Section three analyzes the evolution of Japanese resource policy 
in the post-war period. The major participants in overseas resource 
policy are the Japanese government and private corporations, including 
4 
refiners, smelters, trading companies and resource-consuming companies. 
The Japanese government, particularly MITI, played a major role in the 
formulation and direction of resource policy. Administrative and 
financial assistance to the extractive companies and economic aid to the 
producing countries have been important government policy measures. In 
conjunction with such governmental efforts, private corporations have 
participated in overseas extraction, sometimes alone and at other times 
in organized consortia. Organized consortia became more convnon after 
the mid 1960s. This section will elucidate goals, strategy and tactics 
of the government and corporations, though this objective is hampered by 
the secrecy with which most companies operate. 
Japanese resource procurement can be divided into three patterns: 
simple market purchases, loan-tied purchases and •-utonomous" 
development. The changing mix of these procurement strategies 
subdivides the post-war period into three different segments: 1) the 
early 1950s, 2) the mid 1950s to the mid 1960s, 3) the late 1960s to the 
early 1970s. The overall trend was a gradual movement by the companies 
and the government toward a more active overseas resource policy. 
Simple market purchases gave way to direct participation in resource 
development projects through loan-tied deals or equity investment. This 
change reflected not only the policy changes of the actors in the 
domestic arena but also factors in the international resource economy, 
such as government policies in producer countries and the weakened 
position of the international resource companies. 
Section four examines how the aforementioned policy strategies 
developed in Japan's resource ventures in Southeast Asia (SEA). Due to 
their importance in trade, foreign direct investment and governmental 
aid, the Japanese government and private companies have been very 
economically influential in the countries of this region. Japanese 
involvement in SEA (especially Indonesia and Philippines) is not 
confined simply to petroleum and LNG but encompasse� other minerals, 
such as copper, nickel and bauxite. Resource projects in SEA exemplify 
• 
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the conscious policies that were devised through both governmental and 
private efforts and the close cooperation between them. 
. 
The sources of data and information for this study are varied. 
The most important are various Japanese government documents, especially 
those of Mill. Government documents are useful in aggregating 
statistics and presenting general information on Japanese economic 
transactions in regard to overseas resource policy. The greatest 
difficulty was in the collection of information on specific overseas
• 
projects. Very little concrete data is availabl_e in either government 
documents or other publications. Information was gathered from articles 
in various period�cals, many of which are included in the bibliography. 
The most important sources were periodicals concerning Japanese business 
activities and general studies of the oil and mineral industries. 
This study has been pieced together from disconnected and, 
sometimes, contradictory sources. Even the dates when resource projects 
started and the capital shares of each participant were often missing or 
inconsistent. Limitations in the source materials increased the 
difficulty of deriving a smooth history of the actual policy 
development. 
Finally, the "resources" studied: petroleum, liquified natural 
gas, copper, nickel and bauxite, are examined because they have been 
regarded as especially critical for Japan (see, MITI, 1971). Other raw 
materials, such as rubber and timber were excluded as they are different 
from oil and ■ineral resources in their renewability and their relative 
insignificance for the Japanese economy as a whole. 
• 

I 
Resources and Foreign Economic Policy 
1. THE RACE FOR RESOURCES 
Resources: A Key Factor in Economic and Politjco-Military Power 
For many years resources, especially fuels and non-fuel basic 
metals, have been a key factor in industrialization and international 
political-economic relations. Resource questions tend to be dealt with 
in the academic field of economics because of their importance as 
factors in economic production or as trade cornnodities. It is 
appropriate that they also be considered in the broader contexts of both 
the domestic and the international political economy. The private and 
state sectors of developed and developing countries ·have been deeply 
involved in the world-wide extraction of resources. Resources have been 
and remain a major concern in the formulation of foreign economic 
policy. 
Since the 19th Century European Industrial Revolution, 
technological· innovations have created demand for new and different 
resources such as coal and iron ore for steel-making (Kurosawa, 1977, 
pp. 88-101). The industrial countries needed to secure minerals and 
fuels for both industrialization and politico-military power (Sampson, 
1975, pp. 63-69). Initially, the developed countries extracted raw 
materials from domestic sources, explored and developed through 
indigenous capital. -However, as these sources were exhausted and 
countries became more developed economically, abundant low-cost supplies 
could be found only overseas. Extractive technology, capital and 
military power, which had grown with industrial development, made it 
possible to secure access. to resources worldwide.a1 
1. This is a general pattern of resource policy development, yet,
it is not al ways applicable to all industrial countries. 
7 
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To ensure military, industrial and popular consumption, national 
• 
governments found it necessary to support private exploration and 
extractive activities through the politi_cal and military power of the 
State. In addition, the profits of these activities were an important 
factor in ensuring government support since profits earned abroad 
improved the home country's balance of payments. 2 Thus the corporate 
aim of securing supplies was aided and abetted by the governments of the 
various developed countries. 
• 
England took the lead in mineral development in the nineteenth 
century, but in the twentieth century, . the United States, then an 
. . 
emerging industrial power, also invested in extractive ventures 
overseas. Throughout the f ir·st ha 1 f of the twentieth century many 
countries became involved in international political rivalries based on -
competitive access to raw materials (Eckes, 1979, pp. 1-173). Wars 
between "haves" and "have nots" were an i·mportant characteristic of the 
race for resources (Anderson, 1975). 
The International Oil and Mineral Industry 
Historically, the fuel and mineral industries have been dominated 
by giant international oil and mineral companies. The innate 
characteristics of certain extractive industries in the 20th century: 
high risk, large capital requirements, sophisticated technology, and the 
uneven distribution of resources worldwide combined to promote the 
growth of large multi-national companies (Bosson and Varon, 1977, pp. 
25-26). 
If fuels and minerals are a key factor to production and, 
therefore, to a country's economic and mil4tary power, the mineral 
industry, with its capital and technology, will occupy an important 
2. The U. S. -based oil companies developed overseas sources, not 
for domestic use, but for sale throughout the world. See, Sampson
(1975) Ch. 1-5. 
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position in the world. After World War II (WWII) the U.S. emerged as 
the dominant country, with Britain and France in a secondary position, 
with Germany and Japan clearly subordinate. This hierarchical power 
structure was similarly reflected in the international oil and mineral 
industries. Most of the major international oil and mineral 
corporations are owned by American, British, and French capital. 
For example, in 1970, in the oil industry eight large 
international corporations (Exxon, Gulf, Mobil, Standard of California, 
Texas, BP, Shell, CFP) held 56.21 of the world's crude oil production 
and 54.4% of its product sales. The copper industry was concentrated 
among the ''Big Seven" international corporations (Kennecott, Anaconda, 
Phelps Dodge, Union Miniere, Anglo-American Group, Amax, INCO), 
accounting for about 70% of world production (excluding centrally­
planned economies) until the nationalization of mines in many of the 
producing countries in the late 1960s and early 1970s reduced that share 
to around 351. Further, in 1970 about 701 of aluminum production was 
controlled by 6 major companies (ALCOA, Kaiser, ALCAN, Pechiney, 
Alusuisse, Reynolds). Similarly, only 3 companies (INCO, Falcon Bridge, 
Le Nickel) produced over 80% of the world's nickel. These international 
mineral corporations have historically controlaled a large share of the 
marketing as well as mine production. 
The Mineral Industrv and The state 
As stated earlier, a symbiotic relationship between the government 
and the oil and mineral industries is comon to all of the 
industrialized countries. Whether the aim of exploration and 
development of resources is to earn profits or to ensure supplies for 
the economy, governments protect and support these industries through 
different means at various levels, employing various economic, military 
and diplomatic measures, both domestically and internationally and have 
repeatedly demonstrated their concern for the health of their oil and 
mineral industries through concrete assistance. The disputes between 
Great Britain and the U.S. over Iraqi oil fields after World War I 
10 
(WWI), the overthrow of the Mossadeq government in 1954 in Iran, and the 
military coup in Chile in 1973, illustrate the involvement of various 
governments in furthering their national resource industries {Eckes, 
1979, Ch. 5-8; Stivers, 1981; Moran, 1974; Sampson, 1975, Ch. 6-7). 
Resource policies came to form an integral part of foreign 
economic policies particularly in the post-WWII period, {Tanzer, 1980, 
pp. 17-18; Bosson and Varon, 1977, pp. 3-23; Mikdashi, 1976). There are 
a number of factors which make resource policies important to both 
developed and developing countries. First, more countries are 
participating in the international mineral business through their 
respective companies. The structure of the mineral industry has been 
complicated by economic expansion causing increased resource needs for 
some industrialized countries {Mikdashi, 1976, pp. 24-33). Secondly, 
power relationships among the forces participating in mineral and fuel 
development have changed with the emergence of the newly independent 
nations. Securing access to resources by the major international 
companies of the United States and Europe has become complicated as 
producer countries have attempted to gain more control over their 
resources while the large corporations have tried to retain their 
control (Girvan, 1976a). A third factor in the increased interest in 
resources was the increase in both the aggregate value and quantities of 
minerals and fuels which were being extracted and consumed during the 
post-war period. Soon after WWII, for example, the total value of the 
minerals produced in the world was about $20 billion (1947), while by 
1978 this had increased to $700 billion {Tanzer, 1980, p. 16). All 
three of these factors help explain the greater governmental involvement 
in the world's mineral industries. 
In the race for resources the winners can secure low-cost, high­
grade resources, while losers are forced to purchase from foreign 
suppliers at unfavorable rates. Given the importance of the resources 
for industrial development, it has been the aim of foreign economic 
policy to secure the most favorable position possible. For Japan, which 
is deficient in domestic resources and does not have indigenous mineral 
11 
deposits or integrated international mineral corporations, securing 
access to stable low-cost overseas supplies has been a central concern. 
2. JAPANESE RESOURCE POLICY AND FOREIGN ECONOM IC POLICY 
While resource policy has been important for all industrialized 
countries, for Japanese industries and government it has been and 
continues to be critical. This paper will examine the development of 
Japanese resource policy as a part of Japanese foreign economic policy, 
and will, using case studies, generate insights into the different 
phases of the policy itself as well as policy motives and instruments. 
I 
To analyze the resource policy as foreign economic policy two 
levels of approaches can be considered: the international and the 
domestic (Katzenstein, 1978a).3 One hinges on the argument that foreign 
economic policy is defined by the international politico-economic 
options of the actors. This model argues that "interdependence'' or 
"U.S. hegemony• in the international system, a result of ''modernization'' 
or "America's invulnerability," establishes the international constraint 
under which foreign economic policy has been pursued. That is, the 
international system has defined foreign policies, apriori.4 This 
explanation, which places the origin of foreign economic policy at the 
international level, is effective in that it indicates the sets of 
international political and economic features, which condition the 
strategies of foreign economic policy. However, this approach is 
weakened by its anaiytical inability to discriminate among variations in 
policy objectives, instruments, and the actual conduct of actors in each 
country (Katzenstein, 1978a, p. 13); it does not adequately explain why 
country A has a different foreign policy from that of country Bin the 
3. The distinction between the two levels of approach was 
presented by Singer (1961). On the theoretical discussion of foreign 
economic policy, see Katzenstein (1978a). 
4. This is certainly an oversimplification of various writings, 
however works which lean in this direction are: Morse (1976), Keohane 
and Nye (1977); Waltz (1979). 
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same international system, whether it is "interdependent" or "U.S. 
dominated.a" The weakness of this argument is its failure to recognize 
those domestic factors which predetermine "modernization" or "U.S. 
invulnerability,a" and upon which "interdependence" or "U.S. dominance" 
has been predicated. 
In contrast to the international structure approach, there are 
domestic-oriented approaches to foreign economic policy. One of these 
is the "statist" approach, which focuses on the state as an autonomous 
actor with an independent ideology and goal-setting mechanism. The 
state makes decisions relating to foreign economic policy according to 
national interests, defined as, the "general interest of society" 
(Krasner, 1978, pp. 5-34, 329-352). Although this argument has a 
certain validity since the state does have an independent societal role 
with institutions to pursue policies, it obscures the motivation of 
policy objectives by reducing them simply to "national interest." 
Another approach, also focusing on the domestic origin of foreign 
economic policy, examines the domestic structure. Domestic structure, 
an aggregate which is historically organized by industrialization and 
state control, determines the formation and implementation of foreign 
economic policy. The relationships between the state (government, 
bureaucracy and political parties), and the society (private industry 
and labor) define the "policy and institutional organization which 
conditions policy instruments" (Katzenstein, 1978a, pp. 5-7, 19). The 
statist approach focuses on the state's autonomous policy formation from 
the top, viewing domestic forces as constraints. The domest-ic structure 
approach emphasizes policy as an aggregation of interests emanating from 
society itself. The latter approach, therefore, is a more powerful 
analytic framework when it is assumed that actors in the private sector 
play a major role in policy formation and implementation. This 
approach, which emphasizes the governing coalitions and policy networks 
expressed by social forces, seems to be more pertinent to the analysis 
of foreign policy, it clarifies the diversity of foreign policy in each 
country, that is neglected by the international approach. 
13 
It should be emphasized that the domestic approach should consider 
international forces. The domestic politico-economic structure defines 
policy. At the same time, however, the position of the national economy 
in international capitalism affects domestic politico-economi_c structure 
as well as policy processes. The domestic origin of foreign economic 
policy should be considered inseparable from the international origins.. 
of domestic politics and economy; it is a reciprocal relationship. 
Our central concern is the evolution of Japanese resource policy 
and an analysis of the actors and their policy strategies in both the 
public and·private sector. The domestic framework is therefore most 
useful for my anaJysis. It is assumed that prevailing coalitions of 
domestic forces and their institutional expression in networks will 
illuminate the development and operation of Japanese resource policy. 
The changing policies of the Japanese state and industries can be better 
understood by �lso considering Japan's position in the international 
economy. The international economic environment reflects the power 
distribution of the industrial nations, mineral industries and resource­
producing countries. Japanese economic growth has changed policy 
instruments and has been characterized by different phases of policy 
evolution. 
The Politico-Economic structure and Resource PoJicv 
The close alliance of the state and business, characterized.as a 
"conservative coalition" by Pempel, is the core of the domestic 
po1itico-economic structure, which has facilitated the conduct of 
Japanese resource policy (Pempel, 1978, pp. 145-148, 183). 5 Compared 
with other industrial nations Japan has a "high degree of centralization 
of both state and society, as well as a lack of differentiation between 
them" (Katzenstein, 1978b, p. 314). This tight coalition consists of 
the political institutions of the state bureaucracy, big business and 
5. The theoretical orientation of this paper is taken from Pempel 
(1978, 1982). 
14 
the ruling liberal Democratic Party (LOP), but excludes labor and the 
other political parties (Pempel, 1982, pp. 3-45). The close 
relationship between state and business circles can be traced back to 
Japanese political and economic development since the Meiji era. 
Elements of the post-war coalition include the long LOP reign in 
domestic politics, an autonomous, meritocratic bureaucracy, and the 
overall recognition in business circles of the government's involvement 
in economic activity; most importantly, it includes the shared interests 
of the various groups (Patrick and Rosovsky, 1976, p. 52). Policy 
interconnections between the groups are both formal and informal; a 
policy apparatus for government institutions within the business 
conmunity, financial support for the LDP by business and covert contacts 
between the business and state sectors, bureaucrats and LOP leaders 
(Yanaga, 1968, pp. 1-151). 
The structure of this coalition is characterized by the 
intervention of the state in business activities necessitated by the 
economy and the relative lateness of Japan's appearance in the 
international economy. For Japan to develop its technological and 
productive capabilities an industry-state partnership was needed. 
While Japanese state involvement in the economy has been small in 
comparison to Western industrial states in such areas as public 
spending, it has not been insignificant. Indeed, the national 
bureaucracy has been intimately involved in the direction of business 
policy, supporting, guiding and organizing the private sector; for 
example, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) has 
played a major role in regard to industrial policy. State intervention 
in industrial sectors was facilitated through finance, foreign exchange 
control, license approval and "administrative guidance" (Johnson, 1977, 
pp. 246-260). 
In examining resource policy, the nature of the "conservative 
coalition" between the state and business, and the state's involvement 
in the policy process, helps to explain the policy choices of both the· 
15 
Japanese government and the private extractive industry. It is clear 
that in the field of resource policy the government, especially MITI, 
has played a significant role through close contact with the mineral 
industry. There is a consensus, or at least a co11111on concern, in both 
government and industry relating to the significance of imported 
resources to Japanese industrial production. The heavy dependence on 
foreign sources of raw materials has been and continues to be regarded 
by both government and business as the "unifying national challenge to 
. . 
the Japanese" (Krause, 1976, p. 386). Secondly, this "challenge" and 
the relatively weak position of Japanese extractive industries has 
• prompted governmental efforts to organize industry through 
administrative guidance and the creation of financial and technical 
support agencies. A third factor is based on the changing structure of 
the international oil and mineral industry. As governments of producing 
countries, especially developing countries, assert more control over 
their resources through actions such as nationalization, the Japanese 
are forced to deal with governmental producers or state-owned 
corporations. Thus, there is an increasing need and ability for the 
Japanese government to involve itself in "resource diplomacy" through 
economic and technical aid to supplement private activities and ensure 
resource supplies. What makes Japanese policy unique is the nature of 
the government's cooperative and supportive efforts on the behalf of the 
mineral industry. 
The Growth of the Jaganese Economy a·nd Changes i o Resource Pol 1 cy 
While understanding the government-business relationship is 
essential to understanding Japanese resource policy, it is not 
sufficient to explain the evolution and development of the policies and 
procurement strategies. The analysis must be supplemented by factors 
such as Japanese economic growth and changes in the international 
economy, which enabled the Japanese government and industry to undertake 
different approaches to securing raw materials. 
' 
• 
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After World War II Japan was integrated into an international 
economic system in which the U.S. was dominant. In this system, the 
relationship with the U.S. during the late 1940s and early 1950s was 
critical to Japan's development; U.S. capital and technological 
assistance undergirded Japanese economic development, and the Japan-U.S. 
Security Treaty lightened the economic burden of military spending 
(Shibagaki, 1980). Japan undertook economic development in this 
international setting with a domestic economic structure embodied in the 
post-war reorganization of industry and labor. 
The economic framework set conditions for the development of the 
resource industry as well as for government resource policy. Most 
Japanese petroleum supply passed through hands of the major 
international petroleum companies which dominated the marketing and 
production structure of the international petroleum industry. A lack of 
capital and technology as well as the weak industrial structure of the 
Japanese extractive industries constrained a more independent Japanese 
resource policy. Although the Japanese government was conscious of 
these constraints, dependence on U.S. or Western European-based 
international mineral corporations was overwhelming, prompting the 
Japanese government and industry to develop their own policy (Tsurumi, 
1976a). 
Japanese industry developed and gained strength in the late 1960s 
by taking advantage of domestic and international economic development. 
This growing economic power permitted government and industry to 
exercise a more independent policy.6 The capital accumulated through 
industrial production and exports allowed the industry and government to 
be more active 1n resource exploration and development throughout the 
world. In addition, "resource nationalism" in producing countries, 
particularly in the Third World, shifted the relative positions of power 
in the international oil and mineral industry. This change favored 
6. On increasing Japanese economic strength in the international 
economy, see Block (1977). 
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Japan because it created increased possibilities to participate in the 
resource development in the producing countries. Japan's  resource 
policy, thus, changed in correlation w�th its increasing economic power 
and the structural transformation of the international economy. 
Traditionally Japanese resource policy has been regarded as the 
result of either foreign investment and the multinationalization of 
Japanese firms or the macro-economic behavior of the economy as a wholea. 
Yoshino, emphasizing the organizational and strategic aspects of 
Japanese multinational companies, explains resource policy development 
as one pattern of the growth process of Japanese multinational companies 
(Yoshino, 1976). He does not recognize the special character of the 
mineral industry nor does he examine the development of resource policy. 
Tsururmi and Ozawa argue that Japan's unique corporate culture and 
idiosyncratic industrial structure gave rise to the expansion of 
overseas Japanese resource extraction activities (Tsurumi, 1976b, Ch. 2; 
Ozawa, 1979, Ch. 5 ) .  Their argument essentially concurs with Young in 
stressing the unique role of trading companies in Japan (Young, 1979). 
These are partial explanations of overseas mineral extraction 
activities. They explain neither the reasons why the Japanese 
government and industries pursued certain resource policies nor the 
changing pattern of these policies. Focusing on domestic structure in 
addition to the understanding of international economic structure will 
yield better·aexplanations • 
• 

• 
II 
Resources and the Japanese Economy 
1. RESOURCES IN THE JAPANESE ECONOMY 
Mineral resources have been indispensable as co11111odities of trade, 
energy sources for industrialization, and production materials for the 
development of the Japanese economy. In this section a brief historical 
su11111ary of Japane's  economic development and the importance of mineral 
resources in the economy will suggest that an increasing need for oil 
and minerals has accompanied the Japanese change in industrial 
structuree. 
The Pre-war Economv 
At the end of the Tokugawa era in the 19th century, economic 
activities were largely concentrated on agriculture and household 
manufactures, such as the textile weaving industrye. The economy did not 
consume large amounts of mineral resources and needs could be satisfied 
through domestic production of minerals such as coal and coppere. 
Although external trade was kept to a minimum during the era, large 
quantities of copper and silver were exported through the harbors of 
Nagasaki,  Tsushima and Ryukyu, in exchange for silk and other 
luxuries (Yasuba, 1978, p. 230) .e1 
• 
The opening of the country to foreign trade ( 1858) and the Meiji 
Restoration ( 1868) facilitated capitalist developmente. In the Meij i era 
Japan developed a labor-intensive, manufacturing industry which did not 
require large amounts of minerals. The products of these industries-­
raw silk, tea, seaweed, and sardines--were exportede. The only mineral 
1 .  Copper production began in the 8th century , and Japan, as 
second largest producer, was exceeded only by the U . S. in the early 
1920s. 
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products imported were petroleum and iron, smaller in value than other 
import items such as cotton yarn, cotton and woolen clothes. Further, 
mineral imports were offset by the export of manufactured goods and 
domestic minerals (Vasuba, 1978, pp. 231-232). Until the late 1890s, 
therefore, the Japanese economy put little pressure on domestic mineral 
resources. Until approximately 1880 the mining industry was government­
controlled due to its importance as an earner of foreign exchange and as 
a source of coin material. After being transferred . to the private 
sector, the mining industry formed the core of the oligopolistic 
business combines (Zaibatsu) (Ishii, 1980, pp. 70-81). 
The period between the late 1890s and 1945 was characterized _ by 
rapid structural changes, caused not only by domestic economic 
development, but also by changes in the international politico-economic 
arena. Between the 1890s and the 1920s most Western industrialized 
countries developed heavy industry, while Japan concentrated on light 
manufacturing, such as textiles. The textile industry led economic 
development throughout the pre-war period, and its products were a major 
component of the export trade (Shibagaki, 1980, pp. 3-14). The 
development of heavy industries, such as steel, lagged despite the 
efforts of government and, in later periods, private entrepreneurs 
(Lockwood, 1954). Nevertheless, even the slow expansion of heavy 
industry increased the demand for more minerals than were domestically 
produced, and production fell behind the growing demand. As Table 1 1 -1 
indicates, the transition from mineral surplus to deficit occurred at 
the beginning of this century, although copper and coal continued to be 
exported to Germany, England, and China. 
Chemical and heavy industries, which became more important after 
the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905) and World War I, were encouraged 
further by the political and military developments in the international 
and domesti c  arenas after the 1920s. The conflicts among industrial 
powers for the control of territory for markets and direct investment 
gave rise to protectionist economic blocksa. In response to threats to 
its economic interests, Japan grew more militaristic (Miwa, 1980, pp.a� 
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TABLE 1 1 -1 
EXPORTS AND IMPORTS OF SELECTED NATURAL RESOURCES 
& COMMODITIES, ANNUAL AVERAGE BY GROUP, 1877-1936 
(1,000 yen) 
( 1 )  (2) (3)  
Agricul tural food 
Metal s Mineral s commodit ies 
Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports 
1877-1886 1 , 460 2 ,350 1,320 1,940 8,730 
1887-1896 5,360 8,420 5, 359 4,560 13,390 6, 500 
1897-1906 15,840 32 ,860 16, 540 16,860 18, 900 44,670 
1907-1916 48,400 74,690 23,340 27, 580 31, 160 62 , 530 
1917-1926 96, 460 282 ,930 42,720 103 , 580 61, 280 360, 740 
1927-1936 142 ,300 240,450 41,650 260 ,650 55,580 461 , 100 
Source: Yasuba (1978). 
119-123) . Increased mi l i tar ism resul ted i n  the production of mi l itary 
equipment, such as transports and machinery l eading to rapid growth i n  
heavy i ndustry, rei nforcing i ncreased resource needs . 2 
Trade composi tion changed from that of the early Mei j i  era, 
refl ecting thi s  i ndustrial devel opment.  Exports, were i ncreas ingly 
l ight i ndustrial products , especial ly texti les,  whi l e  imports incl uded 
raw materi a l s ,  such as petrol eum, l umber, coal , and i ron ore, as wel l as 
• 
food . The strategic metal s, such as n ickel and bauxite, were i mported 
2. Coal production rose from 28 mi l l ion tons i n  1931 to 50 mi l l ion tons in 
1939; the import of crude oi l  and petroleum products i ncreased from 2.3 mi l l ion 
kilol i ters to 4 . 5  mi l l i on k i lol i ters i n  the same period (Nakamura , T., 1980 , pp . 
173-174)  . 
260 
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because of the absence of domestic production (Harada, 1971, p .  252) . 
The drastic increase of imported minerales and metals in the 1920s is 
indicated in Tabl e 1 1 - 1 .  The supply of raw material s was supplemented 
by extractive activities outside Japan, especial ly in Manchuria and 
Southeast Asia (Hara , 1980a, p. 192). 3 The search for resources was an 
important factor l eading Japan to mileitary conflicts with other 
industrial powers. 
• 
In sum, the rise of heavy industry in the pre-World War II period, 
especial l y  after the 1920s, and the military needs of the war increased 
demand for mineral resources, which could not be satisfied by domestic 
production; trade and the overseas extraction of fueles and mineral s  were 
necessary to compensate for the lack of domestic resourcese. 
The Post-World War II Economy 
After defeat in World War II, Japan's rapid economic 
reconstruction led to its becoming the second largest economy in the 
capital ist world .  The post-World  War II economy has passed through 
different stages, but overalel growth has been led by rapid 
industrial ization with the resuleting industrial structure resting upon 
chemical s  and heavy industry. 
The first phase of develeopment was devoted mainly to 
reconstruction of the war-devastated economy. During the American 
Occupation, administrative measures such as l and reform, the dissol ution 
of the Zaibatsu, and the implementation of a new labor l aw created new 
economic arrangements. However , production remained focused primaril y  
on consumer goods to meet daily needs (Shibagaki, 1980) . The new 
industrial structure initial l y  resembled that of pre-war; centered on 
3. Manchuria received 70 per cent of Japan' s  foreign direct 
investment in 1930s, especial l y  in the mining sector during the l ate 
1930s (Hara, 1980, p .  192). On pre-WWII extractive activities in 
Southeast As i a , see Section IV of this papere. 
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light industry. Due to a halt in imports, the coal mining industry was 
encouraged to expand by government policy, "keisha seisan hoshiki" 
{ 1946). 4 This policy was formulated to increase coal production for 
industrial use, especially in the steel industry. Later, the increased 
importation of crude oil, coking coal, and coal was approved by the 
Occupation authorities {Miyashita, 1980, p. 56). Though resources had 
to be supplemented by imports, consumption growth was rather small until 
the 1950s and the rapid economic growth after the Korean War. 
During the period from the mid 1950s to the early 1970s, the 
Japanese economy achieved what Western industrial countries accomplished 
over more than halaf a century. Industrial growth included steel, 
automobiles, petro-chemicals and electronics. The loss of markets for 
light industrial products in East As ia ,  through the development of 
indigenous light industries and the closure of traditional markets such 
as China, limited the opportunities to reconstruct Japanese light 
industry. This encouraged the evolution of an industrial system based 
on heavy industry (Shibagaki, 1980, p. 93). In addition, a number of 
elements set the groundwork for the construction of a new heavy 
industrial base. This included the demand created by the Korean War and 
the end of the U.aS. Occupation; domestic factors included a series of 
governmental policies to foster industry, technology introduced mainly 
from the U.S. , a well-educated labor force from rural sector, and high 
rates of reinvestment {Patrick and Rosovsky, 1976, p. 19). 
This shift in industrial structure also changed the resource 
demand structure, especially in energy. A stable supply of low cost 
energy resources and minerals became indispensable for the heavy 
industries. The reorganization of the electric utility companies in the 
1950s promoted thermal power generation requiring increased amounts of 
imported oil over hydroelectric power. Further, liberalization of oil 
4. Onl y 40 per cent of total coal production was available for 
industrial consumption due to shortages; during the pre-war period over 
60 per cent was used in industrial sector (Miyashita, 1980, p. 56). 
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sales in  1952 encouraged the replacement of coal with low cost i mported 
oil which then became the primary energy source. The so-called "Energy 
Revolution" or "L iqu id  Revolution" was completed by the early 1960s 
supplanting the domestic  coal i ndustry in  the process despite government 
efforts to continue coal production (Nakamura, S., 1980). Heavy 
i ndustri aliozation was mai ntai ned by the flow of cheap oil, mai nly from 
the Mi ddle East, and, at the same time, accelerated the demand for fuels 
and resources. Demand for other metals, such as aluminum, niockel, and 
copper, also increased rapidly due to their importance i n  production 
(Fuj i i ,  1971, pp. 192-193). 
The change in  industri al structure was reflected in  trade 
composit ion, i.e . ,  i ncreased exports of manufactured products, both as 
consumer goods and capiotal goods, and the increased importation of 
pr imary commodities, including food and lumber as well as mi nerals. Oil 
and mi nerals, which were ei ther not produced or produced i n  insuffici ent 
quantitioes, were increasiongly i mported throughout the 1950s and 1960s. 
Concomitant with increased imports was an increased dependence on 
foreign resources. Even copper, which had been an export i tem, 
increasi ngly came from foreign sources, 60% of the supply by 1963; 
demand for bauxiote, uranioum, and niockel was met totally by i mports. 
Japan achioeved the second largest GNP and became the second largest 
mi neral consuming and the largest mi neral i mporting country i n  the world 
(Suzuki, 1977). 
2 .  CHARACTERIST ICS OF JAPANESE RESOURCE PROBLEMS 
The Structure of Consumption and Supply 
The rapid  post-war economi c  expansion was due to the development 
of heavy industry and an expansion of exports. Thi s  entai led a massive 
growth in  resource consumption lead ing to a greater dependence on 
fore ign suppl ies. The historiocal relationship between i ndustr ial 
structure and resource use as di scussed in  the previous sect ion 
i ndiocates that the rapid  post-war economic  expans ion further exacerbated 
Japanese resource problems. Thi s dependence has been, to some extent, 
5 .9 
5.4 
4.4 
1 .3  
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more serious than that of other industrial countries. We will examine 
this dependence in light of the structure of the resource industries as 
well as that of consumption and supply. 
There are three distinct features of Japanese consumption: rapid 
increase, enomous volume, and large share of industrial use. First, 
consumption increased at an extremely rapid rate, the average rate of 
increase accelerating greatly in the 1960s in comparison. In the 1950s 
the rate of increase for most minerals was below 101, with the exception 
of crude oil (21 . 51) and aluminum (13 .91) . However, as Table 1 1 -2  
demonstrates, the average annual increase of consumption of fuels and 
minerals during the period from 1963 to 1973 was between 10 and 201 by 
volume. To better appreciate the rapidity of this growth a comparison 
with other countries is in order. In the U .S .  and Western European 
countries, average increases in mineral consumption for the same period 
were between 3 to 51, with the exception of aluminum (5- 101) . More 
remarkably, minerals not produced in Japan experienced even hig�er rates 
of consumption growth than other minerals : aluminum (20.81), nickel 
(17.31) , and crude oil ( 16. 11) . (Mill , 1971 ,  p .2. ) 
Secondly, not only have the Japanese expanded consumption at a 
much higher rate than other countries, but this consumption grew along 
• 
TABLE 1 1-2 
INCREASE OF ANNUAL RESOURCE CONSUMPTION RATE, 
1963- 1973 (I) 
West 
Japan U.S. Gemany France England 
Energy 10 .0  4.6 4 . 1  
Crude 011 16 . 1  5 . 1  1 1 . 0  
1 . 3  
13 . S  6.8 
Copper Ore 13 . 4  3 .9  4.0 5 .2 2.2 
Copper 12.8 2.9 5 .2  0.4 
(excluding ore) 
Lead . 6.8 4 .5  1 .8 2.3 0 . 0  
Zinc 9.8 3.2 4.6 4.8 1 . 4  
Aluminum 20 .8  8. 1 10 . S  6 . 4  
Tin 9.2 0 . 5  3 . 1  0 . 3  1 . 6  
Nickel 17 .3 5 .0  10 . 4  6 .5
Source: Jukagaku-Kogyo Tsushin-sha (1976)  . 
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with the Japanese share of world consumption. In 1973, Japan's share of 
world consumption was 13.7% for copper, 11.a61 for aluminum, 16.a9':. for 
nickel, and 7.8% for crude oil: in 1963 it was only 6.4%, 4.4%, 6.7% 
and 3.7% respectively (Jukagaku-Kogyo. 1976, p. 35). Throughout 
this period the U.S. remained the world' s largest consumer, but Japan 
exceeded the European consumption in the latter half of the 1960s to 
become the second largest consumer. 
Third, Japanese resource consumption, especially energy, has been 
mostly for industrial use rather than for transportation or domestic 
consumption. By the early 1970s 48% of energy consumption was in the 
industrial sector; 12% in transportation and 17% in domestic use. The 
industrial share of energy consumption has been much larger than in 
other industrialized countries. In the U.S. , for example, 28% of energy 
consumed was used in industry, 23% for transportation and 25% for 
domestic use. Even in Germany, which has similar consumption patterns 
to Japan, industrial use as about 37%, transportation 12% and domestic 
use 25% {Nihon Enerugi Keizai Kenkyu-jo, 1977, pp. 40-42 )  . These three 
features, rapid increase in consumption, increased volume, and large 
share of industrial consumption were directly l inked to the heavy 
industrialization, which was based on production using large quantities 
5of resources.a
There are salient features which characterize Japanese supply­
demand structure. One is the relative scarcity of domestic supplies due 
to meager domestic endowments. Japan produces a variety of minerals and 
has been termed a "museum of resources." However, not only has the 
quantity of production been very small, but some basic minerals, such as 
nickel and bauxite, are totally absent. Further, domestic crude oil 
production supplies only a few percent of the total demand. 
5. Chemical and heavy industries accounted for 70% of total 
manufacturing production in the early 1970s (Mill, 1972, p. 45). 
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Second, as a result of the shortage of domestic sources, Japan 
must depend on foreign sources of supply in order to meet the rising 
demand. The degree of dependence increased as domesti c  production 
failed to keep up with increases in demand. Domesti c  supplies of 
copper, lead, and zinc, which Japan tradititonally produced could, by the 
early 1970s, only meet 30-501 of demand; the remainder was imported. 
Dependence upon foreign sources of crude oil, alumitnum, ni ckel and 
uranium has been total or near total (see Table 1 1-3). 
Thi rd, as Japan increased its dependence on resources produced 
abroad, their share of total imports i ncreased. As Table 1 1-4 
indicates, the importance of crude oil and mineral imports has steadi ly  
increased. For example, the mi neral and fuel imports' share of total 
imports was 19.2% in 1955. By 1970 this had increased to 35%, in 
comparison to only 22% for the U.S., 25.6% for Germany, and 2� for 
Great Britain (MITI, 1971, p. 1 2 ) .  Natural resources' share of total 
Japanese imports i s  larger than for any other industri ali zed economy. 
Not only did resources expand as a share of imports, but Japan also 
enlarged its share in the internati onal oil and mi neral markets. In 
addi tion, Japan has been the largest OECD importer of i ron ore, copper, 
coal and crude oil (see Table 1 1-5). Japan ' s  dependence on the 
internati onal mi neral market became such that any change in the market 
would affect the Japanese economy very ditrectly. 
Other points can be made with reference to the import structure of 
resources: Fi rst, Japan imports mi nerals and fuels largely unprocessed 
rather than as finished products. This reflects the post-war Japanese 
i ndustri al structure which was based on the import of raw materi als for 
processing and reexportatiton. Thi s  i s  also related to the post-war 
resource industry strategy of refining products in  consumer rather than 
producer countri es. Thi s  strategy was especitally prevalent among the 
oil companies .  Also, Japan ' s  foreign sources of raw materials 
concentrated in a small number of produc ing countri es and regi ons. As 
Fi gure 1 1-1 indi cates, 80% of crude oil imports origitnate in the Mi ddle 
East, about 70i of copper i mports in the Phi lippines and Canada, and 
. l 
54.6 
19 
71.5 54.9 
99.5 
1,736 
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TAIL£ 1 1  ·3 
OVERSEAS R£SQJRC£ DEPENDENCE (1960, 1965, 1970) 
19701960 1965 
0-C■l!Stic 0YerSHID11m11tic over .... Da■l!ltic OYerlHI 
s,m\x pea1ndenceDeaend■nceS,.COlYUnit I --· .1.• S,mpty R aend .ce -' • -1 •.........,. ..
215 1'5.61Capper 1 ,000t 324 160 50.61 436 185 57.61 
•Leed 108 49 
•Zinc 205 
147 71 51.7 216 54.6 
38.1 681 310 54.5151 26.3 394 244 
N aas 0 100Al111iru1 155 0 100 330 0 100 
Nick.el • 0 0 100100 28 0 100 91 
80.7 111.0 13.2 17.9 NIron Ore ■i l l  ion t 21.1  6.1 61.0 46.2 1.9 00 
59.2 12.1•Coal 17.5 112 35.8 27.1 12.6 
204.1 0.7 99.7■i l l .kl 135.2 0.5 98.6 91.5 0.6 
34.a■i l l .•J m m 0 1,736 0 3,66Z 2,387 Natural Gas 
• • - • 0.7 100Uraniua 1 ,000t - • • 
Total n 21 7.11 
Notes: 
27 11 .41 323 J1 
1 .  OeNl'td includes domestic dema"ld 1nd export. 
Source: NIT I ( 1971 ) Shiaeo Mardli !!2 Tenbo. 
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TABLE 1 1 -4 
IMPORT COMPOSITION 
• 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1974 
Total 967 2 ,471 4 , 491 8, 169 18 ,881 62, 1 10 
•($ mil l ion) -
Compositiono(%) 
Total 100.0 100 .0  100 .0  100 .0  100 .0  100.0 
F.ood 32 .2 25 .3  12 .2 18 .0 1 3 . 6  13 . 1  
Textiloe material s 38 .3 23 . 7  1 7 . 0  10.4 5 . 1  3 . 0  
Mineralos and 1 .  9 7 . 5  1 5 .0 12 . 5  14. 3  8 . 6  
Metal 
Mineral Fuelos 5 . 5  1 1 . 7  1 6 . 5  19 .9 20 .7  40 .0  
Chemical s 4 . 1  4 . 5  5 . 9  5 . 0  5 . 3  4 . 3  
Machionery 0 . 7  5 . 3  9 . 7  9 . 3  12 .2  7 . 6  
Source : Mill , Tsusho Hakusho (White Paper) (various years) 
• 
• 
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TABLE 1 1 - 5  
THE SHARE OF WORLD RESOURCE IMPORTS 
(%) 
Japan U. S. West Germany 
1962 1972 1962 1972 1962 1972 
Iron Ore 26 . 1  41  . 1  26 .6 1 3 . 4  24 . 3  1 5 . 8  
Copper 7 . 0  22 . 0  1 5 . 1 9 . 9  1 7 . 9  17 .4  
Lead 4 . 4  8 . 0  32 .4 18 .4  1 5 . 8  1 5 . 8  
Zinc 3 . 7  14 . 7  30 .6 ' 25 . 8  14 . 1  1 3 . 0  
Bauxite 3 . 3  12 .9 3 7 . 2  28 . 7  1 1 . 2  1 3 . 3  
Tin 9 . 0  18 . 1  33 . 6  32 . 3  9 .4  9 . 5  
Nickel 4 . Z  1 2 .4  42 . 1  29 .9 8 . 0  8 . 5  
Coal 8 .4  25 . 8  0 . 2  0 . 1  7 . 9  4 .9 
Crude Oi 1 7 . 3  13 . 7  15 . 2  13 .4 6 . 7  7 . 8  
Natural Gas 0 . 0  1 .  9 9 1 . 8  37 .9  0 . 0  1 3 . 8  
Note: 
1. Shares 
nickel 
of iron ore, 
are based on 
copper,
value. 
lead, zinc, bauxite, tin and 
2. All other items based on quantity. 
3. Copper, lead, zinc, bauxite, tin and nickel include ingots. 
Sourcea: MITI, (1975). Tsusho Hakusho 
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Figure I I- 1 : Major Resource Suppl i ers and Geographical D i stribution ( 1970) 
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about 98S of bauxi te from Australia, Indonesia  and Malaysia. Further, 
i t  should be noted that 801 of Japan's mi neral and fuel · i mports 
originate in  developing countri es (Jukagaku-Kogyo, 1976, p. 37). 
These trade arrangements make Japan vu1anerable not only to a ti ght 
market, but also to internati onal politics and the resource polic ies of 
produci ng governments. 
Although resource scarcity has always constrained Japan, 
dependence became i ncreasi ngly acute during the 1960s. In addi ti on to 
descri bing the supply and consumption problems resulting from Japanese 
economic development, an examination of the characteri stics of the 
Japanese fuel and mi neral i ndustries i s  needed. 
Resource Industries 
Whi le Japanese resource i ndustri es have developed in  variaous ways, 
this  secti on will examine their co11111on characteristics, hi ghli ghting 
those that make them different from other international oil and mianeral 
i ndustri es. We will fi rst discuss the structure of the petroleum 
industry and then that of the non-ferrous metal i ndustry includiang 
copper, aluminum and ni ckel. 
The foundation of the post-war petrolaeum industry was establiashed 
during the U.aS. Occupatiaon. The industry was prediacated upon the 
strategy of the major internati onal oi l companies as well as the policy 
of Occupati on authori ties. Occupation policy allowed Japanese 
refi neri es to begin producti on condi ti oned upon equi ty-sharing 
agreements between international oi l companies and Japanese refianery 
compani es. Thi s not only put international oi l companies i n  a posi tion 
to control the market for their crude oil productiaon, but also precluded 
the creation of Japanese oil extraction companies si mi lar to those that 
exiasted pri or to WWI I. It must be added that in the immediaate post-war 
period Japan had neiather the technology nor the capiatal to ei ther 
explore for oil  or even build a refinery. As a result, Japanese 
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petroleum compani es had to concentrate on refining and/or sales of crude 
o i l  purchased from the international o i l  companies ( lguchi , 1963, pp . 
370-402)o. 
Hence, the major characteri stic  of the internat ional petroleum 
industry, the i ntegration of the company from o i l  producti on to sal es , 
was impossible for Japanese companies. In the 1960s companies began to 
particiopate in exploration and develo pment (Okamoto, 1980, pp. 1 80-184)o. 
Nonethel ess, lack of integration remains a major characteristic  of 
Japanese oil  companies .  
Another characteristoic  is  that Japanese companies are composed of 
forei gn capitalo-affi l iated and non-affi l iated corporations. The fore ign 
capitalo-affi l i ated or jointloy-owned compani es were created under the 
Occupati on .  By 1950 there were fourteen foreign-affi l iated companies, 
including s ix  wholesal e ,  two refining, and eight refining and marketing 
companies. These can be d iv ided into four mai n  groups : the ESSO-Mobi l  
group, the Calotex group, the Shell  group and other joint operati ons such 
as Getty O i l  and M itsubishi Oi l .  As F igure 11-2  shows the companies in  
each of the three areas -- production, refining and marketing - - are 
l i nked i n  through crude oil  suppl y,  equity participati on ,  and product 
suppl y. These companies control led about 80% of the total ref ining 
capaci ty i n  Japan through the end of the 1950s. 
S i nce the earl y 1950s, a main  goal of Japanese government energy 
pol icy has been to foster i ndigenous refioners and marketers such as 
Idemi tsu, Ni ppon Kogyo, Maruzen , i n  order to gai n some control over 
the Japanese energy market.6 Such new, independent corporat ions, whi ch 
had neither foreign equity partic ipation nor portfoloio  part ic ipation, 
were formed in  the post-1955 peri od. By 1962, however, the seven 
independents sti l l  had onl y about 20,:, of total refi nery capaci ty .  In 
spite of Mill 's  (M inistry of Intern_ational Trade and Industry) efforts , 
6. Mill feared that the internati onal oi l companies woul d control 
the Japanese market compl etely as they did in  the 1890s through such 
tacti cs as dumpi ng (Okamoto, 1980, p. 1 81 ). 
� 
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Fi gure 1 1-2: An Example of Foreign-affili ated Oil Company 
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i--------� ------4� KOGYONENRYOTOA! 
/ 
," ( R  & P) ' , ,  ' , ' 
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Source : Adopted from Chen ( 1967) p .  1 70 .  
Originally from MITI, Sekiyu Sangyo no Genjo. 
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the compani es' weak positi ons in  capital and technology obli ged them to 
acqui re foreign capi tal i n  the form of loans i n  exchange for long-term 
crude purchases.a7 Therefore, despi te diafferences, both foreiagn­
affi li ated corporatiaons and Japanese-owned corporations remain lianked to 
forei gn capiatal. 
The uniantegrated structure of the Japanese petroleum i ndustry 
di ctated complete dependence upon forei gn suppli es of crude oial sold by 
the ei ght major companiaes. "Ti ed oil,a" i n  exchange for equi ty 
partic ipation or loans, prevented the discretiaonary purchases of crude 
from other potenti al sources and prevented the refining corporations 
from embarki ng on exploration and development overseas (Mill, 1971, p. 
52) . 
Unl i ke the petroleum and other mianeral i ndustri es, the Japanese 
copper companies have had no affili ati on wi th forei gn capi tal. These 
compani es had formed the core of the Zaibatsu and i n  the post-World Wara. 
II period retai ned thei r posi tion as copper producers. However, while 
U.S. -based copper companies operated on an i nternati onal scale, 
i ntegrated from mi ning to processi ng, the Japanese compani es remai ned 
confined to domesti c mi ning and smelti ng (Hori koshi,  1971, pp. 155-156) .  
The major i nternati onal companiaes developed huge economiaes-of-scale, the 
Japanese •eig Si x" (Ni ppon Miniang, Miatsubi shi Metal Min ing, Miatsui 
Mining and Smelteri ng, Sumiatomo Metal Mini ng, Dowa Mining and Furukawa 
Mini ng) were not only smaller i n  scale, but were also oriaented almost 
exclusively to the domestic market. 
Japan was self-suffic ient i n  copper ore before World War II. 
Copper shortages began to occur by the mid 1950s as the growing demands 
of the economy outstri pped supply. Japanese copper companiaes were both 
i ntegrated and i ndi genously fiananced, but were i ncreasi ngly forced to 
depend on forei gn supplies, mai nly from Canada and the Phi l ippi nes, to 
7. On Mill ' s  policies, see Secti on III. 
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meet the growing demand (Takahashi , 1968, p. 127). As a result, the 
function of the copper i ndustry i ncreas i ngly became that of smelti ng and 
processing imported ores, what i s  termed "custom smelting" (N i shio,  
1968, pp . 350-352 ). Thus , the character of the copper i ndustry changed 
from an i ntegrated i ndustry to one of custom smelti ng ,  and, by 1960 , 
i mported ore began to replace domestic  ore production. 
The demand for ni ckel, an i ndi spensable element i n  steel-maki ng ,  
i ncreased at a high rate due to the growth of heavy i ndustry. Japan i s  
the second largest consumer of niockel i n  the world. In 1965 , 99% of 
Japan ' s  ni ckel supplies ori gi nated i n  French New Caledonia ,  Indonesia ,  
and Canada. The structure of the nickel i ndustry i s  s im ilar to that of 
the copper i ndustry, except there are no domesti c  sources. The i ndustry 
i s  confined to refining and processing. 
Soon after the outbreak of the Korean War production of niockel 
i ngots and ferro-niockel was begun i n  Japanese niockel smelters us ing 
imported ore. There are n ine companies i n  the i ndustry, d iv ided i nto 
three groups on the bas i s  of their products :  two domestic  companies 
manufacture niockel i ngots (Sumiotomo Metal M in ing and Shimura Kako) , 
f ive domestic  companies manufacture ferro-ni ckel (Sumi tomo Metal M in ing ,  
Shi mura Kako, Nippon M i n ing ,  Ni ppon Yakin ,  and Ta iheiyo Ni ckel) , and 
two subsi d i aries of the i nternat ional niockel companies , Tokyo Niockel 
(INCO) and Ni ppon Nickel (Le Nickel) , manufacture n i ckel oxi des. 
Excepti ng the foreign subs i d i aries,  however, on l y  two companoies 
specialize i n  ni ckel refining; for the others ni ckel i s  only a part of 
the i r  non-ferrous smelti ng operations. The relioance on INCO and Le 
Ni ckel for crude ore supplies ensured that the Japanese nickel companies 
had no chance to i ntegrate from mine to smelter. The domesti c n ickel 
industry has a relatively short hiostory i n  compari son to other non­
ferrous i ndustr ies and has remained relatively undeveloped in Japan 
(Harada, 1971o, p. 251 ) .8 
8. Ferro-niockel production began i n  1939; niockel i ngots i n  1938. 
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The alUllinum industry in Japan started as a processing industry at 
the beginning of this century. These beginnings determined the present 
structure of industry, which is confined to refining, rol l ing and 
tertiary processing; alal of which have develaoped independentlay. The 
industry has no mining sector because of the l ack of domestic resourcesa. 
Further refiners and processors are separate companies. This dispersed , 
unintegrated structure has many disadvantages in securing sources and in 
achieving production economies that l ower costs. The refining 
corporations �re alaso much smal l er than the international alauminum 
companies. For examplae, compared to the six major foreign companies, 
each of the five Japanese refiners (Nippon Light Metala, Showa Denko, 
Sumitomo Chemical , Mitsubishi Chemical Ind. and Mitsui Al uminum Ind. ) 
were from one-third to one eighth the size in assets, and had onl y one­
tenth the total salaes (during the 1960s). 
Another characteristic of the industry is that the domestic and 
foreign capital are delaicatel y intertwined (see Figure 1 1 -3). The l ack 
of domestic sources and an unintegrated structure forced Japanese 
companies to enter capital and technolaogical arrangements with foreign 
companies to overcome their disadvantages. These arrangements assured 
the suppl y of al umina or bauxite and provided technol ogical know-how. 
These arrangements intensified competition among Japanese companies and 
l ead to the excessive competition that has undermined the entire 
industry, especi al l y  the processing sector (Fujii, 1971). Thus, the 
alauminum industry l ike other natural resources industries has had to 
suffer from a weak competitive position due to an inefficient industrial 
structure. 
The Japanese resource industries have some common general 
characteristicsa, which make them different from their international 
competitors. These are historical l y  determined by resource endowments, 
both international and domestic. First, the Japanese oil and mineral 
industry l acks mining and is concentrated in the refining, smelting and 
processing sector, whil e the l arge international firms have a vertical l y  
--
� 
- - . .  - - - - - - - -
· · · · · · · · · Technological t ie·,.,. 
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integrated structure encompassing production to refining. This is 
because Japan lacked domestic resource deposits and therefore had to 
depend on foreign sourcesa. Furthermore, lack of capital and technology 
limited the ab; lity of Japanese companies to expand overseas production. 
The only alternative was to rely on foreign firms to provide for 
Japanese needs. 
Secondly, the unintegrated structure contributed to a relative 
weakness which created uncertainty regarding reliability and stability 
of supply. Unintegrated Japanese fims tended to be less profitable 
than the international mineral companies, because integration allows all 
profits t9 accrue within the company (Girvan, 1976b, p. 109). These low 
profit rates caused the low growth rates which prevented the capturing 
of economies-of-scale. These weaknesses forced the Japanese to depend 
increasingly on foreign sources and to remain vulnerable to the 
international resource companies in supply, volume, and price. Any 
fluctuation in the international resource economy would be transmitted 
to the domestic mineral companies and, eventually, the Japanese economy. 
Finally, the industrial structure prevented Japanese firms from 
undertaking independent overseas resource exploration and development. 
In addition to the lack of capital resulting from low profitability, the 
long-standing relationships with foreign capital made the resource 
companies reluctant to take independent steps as long as cheap, stable 
supplies were available. 
This section has shown that Japanese resource problems which the 
government and the business had to face during the post-war era, were 
caused not only by a physical scarcity of resources in Japan but also by 
economic growth based on heavy industry. Resource problems have 
affected most industrialized countries, in varying degrees. However, it 
has had an especially serious effect on Japan. 
Usually it is theorized that technological innovation accompanied 
by industrial development will decrease the rate of resource demand 
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growth relative to GNP growth (Hayashi, 1971, p. 2-6). In Japan's case 
the opposite occurred because of the emphasis on heavy industryt. 
Concern among both governmental leaders and businessmen throughout the 
1950s and 1960s increased, due to Japan's increased resource dependence .  
Japan's weakness, the lack of domestic resources, worsened in direct 
relation to its economic growth based on heavy industry . 
• 
III 
The Development of Japanese Resource Polices 
after World War II 
The favorable post-war internati onal economic  enviaronment made it 
possi ble for Japan to buy needed raw materi als and sell fi nished 
products throughout the world (Yamamoto, 1975, p. 321). Japanese 
i ndustries developed on the basis of these i nternati onal conditiaons and 
those of a growi ng domestic  economy . As the previ ous secti on suggested, 
heavy i ndustri es expanded rapi dly due to a relatively i nexpensive supply 
of resources; thi s expansi on and abundant i nexpensive suppl ies combi ned 
to i ncrease resource consumpti on. The underlying effect of thi s growth 
duri ng the 1960s was to i ncrease dependence on forei gn resources 
controlled by the i nternati onal petroleum and mineral industry . 
• 
The Japanese government and extractive industries were f�rced to 
adopt a more independent resource policy because of i ncreasing concern 
about growi ng dependence on forei gn suppli es and other developments i n  
the i nternati onal resource economy. MITI deviased policy i nstruments to 
supplement, and sometiames, to lead pri vate i ndustri es' extracti ve 
activi ti es .  The government effort was essential i n  shi fti ng from 
passi ve to more active procurement patterns commensurate with Japan' s  
i ncreasi ng economi c strength. 
• 
• 
1 .  THE PARTICIPANTS AND THEIR STRATEGIES 
Japanese post -war extractive resource policy has not been deviased 
and conducted by eiather the resource i ndustry or the government alone.a1 
1. Dur ing the war, resource extracti on was conducted by state 
corporatiaons, such as Teiakoku Kogyo Kaiahatsu (Imperial Mi neral 
Oev�lopment) and Teiakoku Sekiyu (Imperi al Petroleum) which were set up
i n  1939. 
4 1  
4 2  
It has been the outcome of the intermeshed policies of the public and 
private sector. However, the government, through Mill, played ·a 
significant role in shaping the character of government-industry 
relations in regards to resource policy. The government, especially 
MIT!, is in charge of resource policy, and the extractive industries, 
mineral and petroleum companies, trading companies and consumer 
industries, have been the major participants in the policy proc.ess. 2 
These two groups have taken part in the overseas resource policy with 
their respective policy instruments and strategies. 
Government; MIII 
Prior to discussion of the government policy toward overseas 
procurement, general resource policy will be described as a background 
for the development of the overseas-oriented policy. 
Mill has been involved in resource policy since 1952 when Japan 
regained its independence. Initially, the main emphasis was put on 
domestic resource production and the organization of the domestic 
petroleum and mineral industry. Due to the ·shortage of raw materials 
domestic production was strongly encouraged by the government (MIT I ,  
1972, p. 57) . A typical example was the promotion of coal production 
through supports in the fom of subsidies for the exploration and 
development of domestic mines (Miyashita, 1980 , p .  58) . The 
government ' s  rationalization of the coal mines , however, failed in 
increasing productiont_ sufficiently as coal was unable tQ compete with 
. cheap imported oil.· 
In 1955 Mill encouraged private firms to establish the Petroleum 
Resource Development Corporation (Sekiyu Sh;gen Kaihatsu) with 50% 
government and SOS private capital to undertake the exploration and 
2. Mikdashi (1976) and Tanzer ( 1980) suggest examining 
governments in both consuming and producing countries and the extractive 
industry as participants in resource policies. 
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development of domestic petroleum (Jukagaku-Kogyo, 1976, p. 73). 
In addition to concern over insufficient resource supplies, MITI was 
worried that foreign subsidiaries or foreign-affiliated resource 
industries might gain control of the Japanese market (Okamoto, 1980, p. 
181; Tsurumi, 1976b, p. 15). It was regarded as essential for the 
Japanese economy to have its own basic industries in such areas as 
smelting and petroleum refining (MITI, 1972, p. 52). To limit foreign 
entry and to foster domestic companies, MITI introduced various 
measures, including regulations on foreign exchange and foreign 
investment, assistance in acquiring capital and overseas technology and 
tax subsidies for the domestic mineral industry. 3 
Laws passed in the 1950s, such as "Draft Law of Metal and Mining 
Industry Stabilization (Kinzoku-Kogyo Antei Rinji Sochi Ho)" and 
"Draft Law of Nickel Smelter Promotion (Nikkeru Seiren Jigyo Josei 
Rinji Sochi Ho) (1951)" provided the non-ferrous mineral smelters with 
benefits such as tax exemption for ore imports and credits for the 
construction of new smelters (MITI, 1971, pp. 70-71). Foreign 
technology as well as raw material was channelaed by MITI to the mineral 
and oil industries while foreign participation was kept to a minimum by 
the Foreign Investment Law. (Tsurumi, 1976b, p. 39, p. 58). In the face 
of trade liberalization, tariffs on mineral ingots were imposed in 1961 
to protect domestic smelters that processed imported ores (MFA, 1972, 
pp. 333-336). MITI attempted to foster and protect the limited number 
of mineral corporations which were expected to become competitive 
refiners. For this purpose MITI adopted various legislative measures to 
control the infl ow and outflow of capital, goods and technology (Pempel, 
1978, p. 161). 
Because of its importance as energy source as well as raw material 
for heavy industry, a more direct policy was introduced in the case of 
petroleum. In the 1950s, as petroleum replaced coal as the chief energy 
3. On MITl ' s  instruments in Japanese foreign economic policy, see 
Johnson (1977) pp. 246-260 . 
• • 
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source, Mill ' s  policy was aimed at the procurement of stable suppl ies as 
cheaply as possible for users that MITI targeted as key industries such 
as steel and petro-chemicals. 4 Given the structure of petroleum 
industry, there remained uncertainty about supply, because foreign­
affilaiated oil refiners and marketers were dominant in the industry. 
Therefore, MITI, through control over foreign exch�nge allotments, 
favored domestic refineries and wholaesalers by preferentially allocating 
the crude oil supplies (Nishida, 1979, p. 20). The main purpose of the 
policy was to nurture fully Japanese-owned refinery and marketing firms 
to lessen the dependence on foreign companies and ensure an 1 nexpens1ve 
and sufficient supply of oil (Tsurumi, 1976a, p. 115)  . 
Though foreign-affilaiated refiners were dominant in the industry, 
only on exception did foreign ownership exceed 50% of paid- i n  capital. 
This is very different from Western Europe where many such subsidiaries 
are 100% foreign owned (Nihon Sekiyu, 1977, p. 87) .  This was the 
outcome of a compromise between the Japanese government and foreign oil 
companies. This compromise met the MITI objective of lessening foreign 
management and control of the industry and market (Chen, 1967, pp. 182-
184 )  , but ensured that foreign oil companies cou ld  continue operations 
in Japan. 
In 1961, prior to the liberalaization of import restrictions which 
diminished MITla' s  resource import controlas, the Energy Committee 
(Enerug1 Kondankai )  was organized by MITI to propose future policy 
guidelines in energy policy. The proposal suggested in December 1961 
that: 
Since petroleum is the basic energy source in Japan, 
it is necessary to secure low-cost and stablae supply
of oil. . . .  Government is required to devise an oil 
4. In 1955 Mill l aunched polaicies to promote the petrochemical
i ndustry with the policy guideline "The Promotion Policy of Petro­
chemical Industry.a" (Nakamura, S. 1980, pp. 45-54 )  . 
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policy so that a certain share of domestic market 
coul d be controlaled by Japanese (quoted in Nihon 
Sekiyu, 1977, p. 96). 
The 1962 Petrol eum Industry Law, which was implemented in repl y to this 
proposal , provided Mill with a new regul atory device. The l egisl ation 
authorized MITI to permit the builading of new refineries and the 
expansion of existing refinery facilities according to Mill's "petrolaeum 
supply pl an . "  Mill's position was that the pol icy was mulatipurpose; to 
insure a stable and cheap supplay of oila, to foster competition with 
foreign-affilaiated firmsa, and to prevent over-competition caused by 
capital l iberaliz�tion. Under the Petrolaeum Industry Law, Mill was to 
maintain order in the petrolaeum industry through the permit system and 
administrative guidance (Watanabe, 1975). 
Yet, whatever the intentions were, the law's effect was to keep 
the petroleum industry overcrowded with increasing numbers of domestic 
refineries and marketersa. As the worl d petroleum market became gl utted 
• 
i 
.  during the earl y 1960s and Mill's concern about a stable supply of oil 
decreased, Mill's oil pol icy objective became the maintenance of l ow 
prices for petrolaeum consumers. Mill's Japanese oil industry polaicies 
under the Petrolaeum Industry Law al l owed many new refiners and 
wholaesalers to enter the market. This l ed to intense salaes competition 
contributing to l ow profit rates for Japanese oil companies. Therefore, 
in spite of Mill's cl aim that it was fostering the industry, the 
structure of the industry remained fragmented and weak .  The tariff 
polaicy against th� import of petrolaeum products and the competition 
among oil refineries ensured low oil prices to the consumers; the heavy 
industries and utility companies (Tsurumi, 1976a, p.  116) . Thus, one of 
Mill's goals, low prices for refined products was achieved at the cost 
of a weak industrial structure. In this way, the Petroleum Industry Law 
facilitated Mill's conduct of its petroleum industry policy throughout 
the 1960sa. 
• 
46 
• 
Resource policy throughout the 1950s was domestic oriented and 
directed toward the domestic mineral industries with the purpose of 
nourishing and protecting them from foreign competition. It was also a 
policy of cartelization which reduced the number of firms in each field 
and ensured competition {Watanabe, 1975, p. 263). Measures were 
introduced so that low priced resources were available for consumers 
while protecting the domestic mineral industry. At times these two 
goals were contradictory. For example, in the casee. of the petroleum 
industry, the glut of oil in the world market in 1950s and early 1960s 
promised cheap supplies, dissipating governmental concern about 
supplies. The policy was to remain focused upon organizing domestic 
industries and maintaining low pricese. The relatively weak mineral and 
fuel industry had little chance to develop their own ore and crude 
supplies, except in iron ore and coale. These factors induced MITI and 
the industries to adopt rather passive, inwarde-looking policies towards 
overseas extraction. 
In contrast to the protective resource policy in the 1950s, by the 
mid 1960s Mill had gradually initiated more comprehensive resource 
poliecies, including a policy of encouraging overseas extractive 
activities. When the Petroleum Industry Law was implemented in 1962 
MITI set up the Overall Energy Section {Sago Enerug1 Bukai) in the 
Industrial Structure Council, Mille' s  Advisory Councile. Its objective 
was to develop a more systematic energy policy with policies not only 
for coal but also for nuclear power and petroleum (Yanaga, 1968, pp . 
180-185). The first report in 1963 reemphasized the indispensibility of 
a low-cost and stable supply of petroleum for the Japanese economy, 
along with the importance of control of a certain share of the oil 
markete. The measure to be used to achieve this was M ill's support of 
the domestic petroleum industry under the Petroleum Industry Law. The 
committee also suggested that it was necessary to promote overseas 
exploration and development of crude oil, although this overseas effort 
received less emphasis (Nihon Sekiyu, 1977, p .  97). 
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The necessity of a concrete energy policy was realized not only in 
Mille, but also in the Diet, which passed a resolution in 1964 calling 
for a more complete energy policye. In accordance with the popular 
concern MITI created the Overall Energy Research Council (Sogo 
Enerug1 Chosa Kai )  in 1965 as an independent council composed of 
scholars, journalists and businessmen charged with the responsibility of 
devising a comprehensive and systematic energy policy (Watanabe, 1975, 
p. 267). The council was assigned the task of setting the goal of 
future energy policy and of proposing the policies to achieve that goal. 
Their report in 1967 cautioned against too great a dependence on foreign 
sources of crude oil. It emphasized the need for a more independent 
overseas resource policy, proposing not only geographical 
diversification of supply sources but also the promotion of overseas 
exploration and development. Further, the creation of a governmental 
agency to support overseas development efforts was suggestede. The final 
council goal was that by 1985 3� of Japanese oil consumption be 
satisfied with crudee-oil developed by Japanese companies (Nihon Sekiyu, 
1977e, p. 98) .  
Meanwhile, the Resource Research Committee (Shigen Kenkyu 
linkai )  in the Japan Economic Council (Keizai Shingi Kai)  was organized 
in May 1969 including officials from MITI, Economic Planning Agency, 
Ministry of - Agriculture ,  and Science and Technology Agency. Their 
reporte, issued in December, 1969e, clearly suggested the need for Japan 
to participate in overseas extraction activities and used the term 
"autonomous development• of resources by Japanese (Keizai Shingikai , 
1969 , pp. 131-145) .  Furthemore , it reco11111ended •resource diplomacy" 
"to smooth the ground between the governments of Japan and producer 
country so that .private companies can launch resource development 
promptly" (Keizai Shingikai , 1969, p. 149)e. This report re-emphasized 
the strategic importance of overseas resource development for Japanese 
economye. 
In 1970 a research mission was sent by MITI to investigate the 
overseas energy situation. The objective of the mission was to discover 
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a more independent way of importing oil than the "tied-crude" method. A 
report by the Overall Energy Research Council in 1971 stated that Japan 
should search for "autonomous" sources of resources by promoting 
exploration and development projects as well as developing alternative 
methods of insuring supply. The report is noteworthy because it pointed 
out the changing structure in the international mineral industry, which 
presented the Japanese with the opportunity to develop a more 
independent resource policy. In the same year Mill •published its first 
complete report describing the Japanese resource situation, the "Natural 
Resource White Paper", which advocated increased efforts in overseas 
resource exploration and development. Although it avoided the phrase 
"autonomous development" and used phrases such as "development 
participation,a" "resource development would be at the center of Japanese 
foreign investment" (MITI, 1971, Ch . 2) . These reports by MITl's 
advisory organs suggest the increasing concern regarding resource 
problems and actual resource policies, especially with regard to 
petroleum. Mill's concern for resource procurement in the 1960s and the 
early 1970s shows a definite shift in attitude from protectionism to one 
of actual policy management. 
This shift was reflected in the creation of Mill's special 
committees on energy as well as in the content of proposalas made 
throughout the 1960s. The increasing dependence on foreign sources of 
petroleum and minerals created increasing concern among MIT I ' s  
officials, not only in regard to price but stable supply as well. This 
was true because in MITI's opinion, low-cost resources were the key 
factor for Japanese production. This was due to Japan's insufficient 
capital and lagging technology in comparison to the U . S .  and Europe. 
Combined with high land and labour cost, this had the possibility of 
constraining production (Hayashi, 1971, p. 3) . Furthermore, in order to 
operate large factories without any interruption, resources had to be 
supplied constantly, at as low a price as possible (Girvan, 1976a, p. 
14). In addition to the price concern which MITI had had since the 
1950s, the stability of supply became an important concern in the mid 
1960s. 
• • 
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In fact, dependence on foreign sources was not seriouso.oas long as 
the supply was guaranteed at relatively low prices. However, a variety 
of factors in  the i nternational arena developed in  the 1960s increasing 
uncertai nty regarding the stability of low-cost supplies. One was the 
behavior of international mineral industries, whi ch consumer countri es 
could not cont�ol. The .osupply system was r ig id  not only because of the 
nature of resource endowments, but also because the internatio nal 
mi neral and o il  companies were integrated from product ion to marketing 
(Ke izai Shi ngikai, 1969, pp. 108-109). This was uniomportant wh i le 
Japan' s  consumpti on was small and increases could be met from existi ng 
production. However, as Japan's demand increased enomously and as the 
market tightened, the mioneral companies responded by curtail ing 
shiopments or rais ing prioces. The i nternational supply system controlled 
by the international corporations created an unpredi ctability of supply 
and pri ce (Hayashi ,  1971, pp. 4-5)  . 
Second, in the 1960s the producer countries demanded more control 
over mineral and o il  produced i n  their respective countries and 
i ncreased royalti es or the posted price of products. The creation of 
producer unions, such as OPEC (1960) and CIPEC (1967) and the series of 
nati onalizati ons i n  producer countri es, such as copper i ndustry in  Chi le 
(1964 and 1969) and in  Zambia  (1969) also destabili zed the internat ional 
resource markets, affect ing pri ce and supply • 
. Thi rd, any fluctuati ons in  the internati onal resource market 
affected Japan ' s  supply. For example, the INCO strike i n  1966 caused a 
supply shortage for Japan. Other events, such as the Vioetnam War, a 
confli ct i n  Zamb ia ,  strikes i n  copper mines in  U.S. and Chi le, all 
caused or contri buted to the i ncreased copper prioces for Japanese 
compani es i n  the post-1965 peri od. These unpredi ctable factors i n  the 
i nternat ional arena heightened Mill ' s  concern regardi ng the 1 ncreas1ng 
dependence on foreign resources (MITI, 1971, pp. 188-191). 
M ITI, bei ng concerned about the resource problem, became more 
acti vely committed to a more independent resource poli cy of securi ng 
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resources from sources being developed with some Japanese capitala. For 
Japan, which had no mineral and petroleum companies comparable to the 
giant international corporations, it was difficult to decide how and 
where to invest in extractive activity. MITI played a very important 
role in ameliorating the weakness of Japanese industries. It supported 
and encouraged companies, through policy instruments, to eabark on 
resource exploration and development. These instruments included the 
establishment of governmental agencies for the provi.sion of financial 
and technical support to private industries. In addition, MITI rendered 
"diplomatic" assistance to extractive activities by providing economic 
and technical aid to producing countries. 
In 1967, MITI established the Petroleum Development Public 
Corporation (PDPC) (Sekiyu Kaihatsu Kodan) by reorganizing the 
existing Japan Petroleum Resource Development Corporation (established 
in 1955). This was a response to the recommendations of Mill 's advisory 
body, the Overall Energy Research Council. In the meantime, petroleum's 
pl ace among primary energy sources rose from 20% in 1955 to almost 60% 
i n  the mid 1960s, and was expected to increase further. This increase 
indicated the importance of developing overseas sources even during a 
world oil glut. The search for oil had been started by Japanese 
companies after the mid 1950s, but was rather sporadic and was 
technologically and financially handicapped. By the mid 1960s more 
systematic encouragement of the government was considered necessary to 
overcome these problems (Mill, 1971, pp. 301-307). 
The PDPC offered both equity and loan capital to private 
corporations to undertake exploration and development of energy sources 
such as petroleum and LNG. It also assisted companies by underwriting 
the financial risk of projects to ensure financing from ?ther 
institutions. Moreover, it offered rental of explorati' on machinery, 
technical consultants and provided geological studies for exploration 
and development. Loans to unsuccessful exploration ventures are 
partially forgiven. All assistance is offered under the condition that 
the Japanese company either gains control over the project in terms of 
5 1  
• 
• 
equity participation, or has voting and product rights in accordance 
with its participation (Jukagaku-Kogyo, 1976, p. 54) . 
The function of PDPC was to provide technical as well as financial 
assistance in support of private companies' overseas efforts which 
otherwise would have operating difficulty. Total financing by 1975 was 
242.4 billion yen for 45 projects of which 56.4% was in the form of 
investment and 43.6% in loan. The geographic distribution of financing 
was the Middle East 65.43%, Southeast Asia 1 2.28' and Latin America 
10.37%, respectively (see Table 111-1o) .  Furthermore, the PDPC not only 
supported exploration activities, but also encouraged private 
corporations to organize new oil exploration and development companies 
among themselves. The,otrading companies and oil refineries, which had 
not been involved in oil exploration before, were encouraged, through 
PDPCo' s  assistance, to embark on new projects. In this sense, the 
policies est�bl ished by PDPC indicated the direct of public policy to 
private companies (Yoshino, 1975, p .  258). 
M il l ' s  effort to organize the mineral industries for overseas 
extraction also had started in the early 1960so. MITI encouraged 
cooperation among mineral corporations in overseas development 
activities. For example, MITI  coordinated the formation of the Overseas 
Mineral Resource Development Corporation (Kaigai Kobutsu Shigen 
Kaihatsu) by non-ferrous metal firms in 1962 with capital participation 
of the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund (OECF), a governmental foreign 
aid agency. MITI maintained that cooperative mineral development was 
preferable because it could overcome the weakness that a single Japanese 
company would have in overseas activities (Keizai Shingikai, 1969, p. 
144) . 
In order to further these efforts , in 1968 a new overseas resource 
development section was set up by Hill as a government corporation 
called the Metal Minerals Development Promotion Corporation (MMOPC ) 
(Kinzoku Kobutsu Tanko Sokushin Jigyo-dan) , also known as the 
Metal Mining Corporation (MMC) (Kinzoku Kogyo Jigyo-dan), to 
• •  • • • • 
3,564 
3,505 
2,770 7,590 
37,647 
3,845 7,754 
TABLE 1 1 1 · 1  
L�NS ANO INVESTMENT BY POPC (by geographical region and by year) 
( 1  mitl l ion yen) 
1974 Projects1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1975 Total 
Southeast Asia 800 4,298 1,038 1,075 2,352 5,899 7,916 29, 769 12 
5• •  . - • • OCeania 52 60 164 293 1 ,130 1 ,806 
Middle East • •  1,200 5,520 57,675 158,633 919,503 
2,961 3,923 15,014 6Africa 620 1,930 2,170 
• •  • • • • 26 1,230 14, 101 9,023 25,140 5South Merica 200 560 
c.n 
North Merica . - 1,046 260 91 - - 30 • •  • •  1 ,247 2,674 4 N 
Overseas Total 800 5, 125 6,654 10,729 11,282 20,509 26,495 71,551 81,590 234,735 41 
pciaest ic  2,187 2.449 1,544 1.286 215 7.6§1 4 
Total 800 5,125 6,654 10,729 13,469 22,958 28,039 n,837 81,805 242,416 45 
lnvest•ents 800 4, 147 5,074 8,658 12,939 19,113 20,285 27,949 136,612 (56.4) 
loans • •  978 1 ,580 2,071 530 44,Na 44,158 105,804 (43.6) 
,Source: Nihon Sekiyu, IC .  IC .  (1980). Sniyu Bi nran. 
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organize an overseas mineral development system as well as become a 
central promotional instrument. The function of MMOPC was similar to 
that of PDPC in providing financing and technical aid. Information 
gathering about prospective ore bodies and geological studies was 
conducted by MMOPCo, especially in developing countries where complete 
studies on promising mining areas were unavailable. These studies were 
pursued by MMDPC with a Millo-commissioned budget in cooperation with the 
Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA)o, another governmental 
organ. The Japanese government also used the MMDPC to extend project 
financial assistance in developed countries; in developing countries the 
OECF fulfilled the same financing function. (See Figure 1 1 o1-1.) As was 
the case with petroleum development, Mil l's aim was to establish a base 
for private overseas projects by increasing opportunities for 
participation while lessening exploration and development risks through 
government guarantees (Jukagaku-Kogyo, 1976, p. 60). 
In addition to direct governmental assistance to private 
companies, another strategy was to extend assiostance to a specific 
project in that project's host country. As mentioned in the previous 
section , in the 1960s, the sources of Japanese raw materials were 
concentrated in developing countries. Unlike the 1940s and 1950s , 
resources in the 1960s became increasingly controloled or supervised by 
the governments of the developing countries. Thereforeo, there were more 
opportunities for the Japanese to deal directly with the governments or 
state controlled resource corporations in producing countries. 
Mill ' s  197 1 Natural Resource White Paper States : 
Now that the resource question is more a major 
concern of the state than of private firms in 
developing countries , it is essential to deploy an 
active resource diplomacy in order to keep good 
relationship with these countries (MITI ,  197 1 ,  p. 
305). 
For the Japanese government ''oresource diplomacyo'' was one policy tool to 
achieve the goal of establoishing an independent resource supply 
structure. This "resource diplomacy" was embod ied by Japan' s  bilateral 
� 
,n 
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"economic cooperation" and "aid" to producer countries (Yamamoto, 1978, 
pp. 31-39). However, the idea of economic diplomacy with aid was not 
new. Historically, Japanese aid, or at least a major part of it, 
contributed to private business operations in recipient countries. 
Reparation payments to Southeast Asian countries were a key to Japanese 
economic expansiaon in the region in the shape of expanded markets for 
Japanese product, factories and export capital (Yamamoto, 1978, pp. 18-
30). 
"Non-conmercial aid" to developing countries, referred to as 
Official Development Assistance (ODA), is nearly 30% of "economic aid,a" 
and includes yen-credits and technical assistance as well as reparations 
t� Southeast Asi a. The yen-credits offered through the Export and 
Import Bank and OECF comprised about 50-60% of ODA in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s (MITI, 1975a, p. 135). The yen-credits for investment in 
specific project are called "project aid" and occupy 59.61 of the 
cumulative value of the yen credits between 1957 and 1975 (MITI, 1975a, 
pp. 196-197). Further, some of these credits have been directly tied to 
resource development projects. In such cases the yen credits are 
conditioned upon Japanese access to the resource project or to the 
project's products. Since Japan 's  first governmental aid in 1951, tied 
to an Indian iron-ore development project which assured iron-ore 
supplies for the period of repayment, project aid has been utilized as 
an effective way of acquiring resources and exporting Japanese products 
(Uemura, 1967). Thi.s type of yen credit was granted to Indonesia in the 
1960s and early 1970s, for example, in exchange for access to LNG and 
oil projects and their supply. 
Aid has al so been used for the construction of such infrastructure 
as transportation facilities, housing, and conrnunication systems, which 
complement the extractive ventures (Ohashi, 1980). Infrastructural 
investment has increasingly become part of contracts signed for resource 
development projects, and Japanese government aid is being channeled 
into infrastructure for mineral development projects in which Japanese 
companies participate (Saito, 1977, p. 270). 
' 
56 
Technical assistance is utilized as another policy tool to further 
resource exploitation by Japanese companies in developing countries. 
Although the share of technical assistance in ODA is small (5.6% in 
1973) when compared with West Germany (26.5%) and France (44 . 7%) , it 
facilitates research for specific development projects in various fields 
{MITI, 1974a, p .  230) .  The studies conducted include those on resource 
development and related infrastructure projects. MITI not only 
commissioned geological studies of prospective regions, but also 
conducted regional development planning in cooperation with JICA, 
formerly the Overseas Technical Cooperation Agency,tand MMDPC. Actuallyt, 
the technical assistance policies on mining are prepared by the 
Technical Cooperation Division of MITI and reviewed by JICA (Rix, 1980, 
p.  165) . Mill claims these are informational studies of potential mines 
and are done by Japanese "in place of governments in develtoping 
countries" (MIT I ,  1975a, p. 234). However, these are, in addition , 
feasibility studies of resource development projects which can be 
offered loans or investments by the Japanese government. In 1974 
studies were being undertaken in Kalimantan ( Indonesia), Luzon (the 
Philippines), and Hichikijai (Peru), places where Japanese extractive 
industries had strong interest (Mil l ,  1975a, p. 242). 
The other type of government aid, Other Official ·Flows (OOF), 
represents about 50% ( 1970) of total government aid. OOF is comprised 
of official export credits, equity investment credits and capital 
subscriptions and purchases of bonds issued by multinational aid 
agencies {Sakurai , 1972 , pp. 54- 55). Among these, equity investment 
credits and capital subscription comprise approximately 20% of OOF 
( 1970) and assist private overseas investment with capital from the 
Japanese government (Hasegawa , 1975 , p .  31). The value of overseas 
equity credits and capital subscription have increased rapidly, from 
$28 . 6  million in 1966 to $55 .9 million in 1969 , $143. 1 million in 1970, 
$264 million in 1972 and $569.8 million in 1973. 
For resource projects, the flow of ''aid'' includes not only credits 
for explorat ion from the Export- Import Bank, but also finance capital 
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for exploration and development of projects through OECF. Governmental 
financing, combined with the private investment capital and loans are 
the basis for the overseas resource projects (Sakurai, 1972, p. 1 13). 
By the late 1960s this type of aid was channeled to large-scale resource 
projects, such as the Arabian Oil Corporation ( 1958), Sulawesi Nickel 
Development Corporation ( 1961), the North Sumatra Oil Corporation 
( 1965), and the Congo Mining Development Corporation ( 1967) . 
• 
"Governmental aid" is closely tied to private resource development 
efforts in developing countries producing primary goods. This 
governmental support for resource projects has been received not only by 
private companies in the form of credits or investment but also by 
producer governments and/or state-owned resource industries in the form 
of yen-credits, technical assistance, and infrastructure construction. 
The link between the government aid and private resource development 
indicates the coordination of government ·and the extractive industry in 
securing independent sources. 
Private Corporations 
Resource Industry 
The participants in oil and mineral extraction can be divided into 
two �roups, although in many cases they overlap. One group consists of 
the mineral and oil 'industries, whose principal operations are resource 
production, refining and processing. The other is a group of trading 
companies and consumer industries which had not been involved in 
resource operati ons in earlier periods. Because of their unintegrated 
structure, the resource industry had been reluctant to participate in an 
active search for the new sources until the mid 1960s. Technological 
and capital constraints also prohibited independent activities. To 
secure ore or crude oil the companies relied largely on the open-market 
or long-term supply contracts. 
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By the end of the 1960s, mineral refiners faced problems in 
securing sufficient supplies and were compelled to search more actively 
for sources. By then, the industries had established processing plants 
which they could not afford to keep idle due to input shortages 
(Tsurumi, 1976b, p. 40). Therefore, it was of vital interest to 
maintain the flow of raw materials, and consequently, they sought a 
method of acquiring secure sources through employment of their 
increasing capital and technological capabilities. The main objective 
of their ventures was to ensure supply from captive sources. 
Another factor motivating the resource industry to embark upon 
overseas ventures was the search for smelting and processing sites 
outside of Japan. By the early 1970s increasing public concern over 
pollution led to the required installation of anti-pollution devices in 
smelting facilities. This increased the costs of mineral smelting and 
companies responded by building smelting and processing plants overseas. 
Further, the high cost of electricity in Japan made it advantageous for 
the aluminum industry to smelt in the countries where the bauxite was 
mined if they also had low cost electricity (Fujii, 1971, p. 201). 
The non-foreign affiliated oil refiners, though of limited power, 
attempted to strengthen their competitive position vis�a-vis the foreign 
affiliates. The most important method was to secure independent sources 
of supply to gain some bargaining power. Furthermore, some Japanese 
refiners, the so-called "kombinat• refiners, were attached to big oil 
users such as the petrochemical and utility companies and had the same 
interest in cheap oil as other consumers (Okamoto, 1980, p. 182) . 
Trading Companies  and Consumer Industries 
Trading firms (Sago Shosha) traditionally have engaged in 
the mineral trade (Young, 1979, p. 7). 5 There are a variety of factors 
5. By 1975 about 50% of resource imports were handled by the top 
ten trading companies. 
59 
which prompted increased trading company involvement in the resource 
industry in the 1960s, not only as traders, but also as producers. 
First was the trading companies' interest in obtaining low prices and a 
stable supply of resources for their customer industries (Kamakura, 
1976, p. 312 ). They could link extractive projects to other co11111ercial 
interests, such as machinery and plant exports related to the projects. 
Thus, as resource shortages appeared, they were motivated to participate 
more actively in overseas ventures. The biggest stimulus was the 
government's  encouragement through the establishment of the PDPC and 
reinforcement of the MMDPC, indicating to the trading companies the 
direction of future resource policy. 
Trading firms played two different, but often overlapping, roles 
in overseas extractive projects . The first role was that of project 
organizer ; the other was as an investor. By the mid 1960s each trading 
company shared individual projects with mineral and oil industries, 
sometimes as an organizer and other times as an investor, through loans 
and equity participation. For example, in the case of petroleum, a 
development company was organized for each project by a trading company 
and other participants. After the mid 1960s trading companies extended 
their organizing function to the coordination of larger scale projects 
for both mineral and consumer industrites. They also joined the ventures 
as investors, sometimes with other trading companies. In the late 1960s 
their role as investor became increasingly important. 
Their role as "organizers of large projects" occurred late 
chronologically. This was especially true in regard to oil extraction 
projects. In this new pattern trading companies formed the core of a 
group of firms which were related financially (Keiretsu). The group 
usually comprised of the trading company, a core bank and other non­
petroleum industries. A consortium formed by the group usually 
participated in more than one exploration and development projectt. In 
the 1960s many of these development projects were launched in  response 
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to MITI policy initi atiaves.a6 After the mid 1960s the trading companies 
increasi ngly played a leadi ng role i n  overseas resource enterpriases, not 
only as organiazers, but also as investors because of theiar growiang 
fi nancial capabi li tiaes and access to infomation. 
Consumer industries also particiapated in  these trading company 
organiazed ventures. Concern about future resource supply al so prompted 
them to secure "captiave sources.a" For example, the electriac and gas 
uti lity companies joi ned i n  petroleum and LNG development and the steel 
industry entered into iron ore and ni ckel development. Inter-iandustry 
cooperati on i n  resource development became even more marked notable 
after the mid 1960s. 
2. PATTERNS OF PROCUREMENT 
The patterns of resource procurement are di vi ded into three 
categori es: market purchases or "si mple purchases,a" loan-ti ed 
purchases, and "autonomous develaopment. "a7 Changes i n  resource pol i cy 
can be characteriazed by shiafts in these resource procurement patterns, 
the main  characteri sti cs of whi ch wi ll be di scussed i n  thi s  secti on. 
Pure conunerciaal transactiaons at market priaces, whether long- or 
short-term, are co11111only termed market purchases or "siample purchases" 
(Aiahara, 1980, pp. 258-259). Thias pattern has predomianated and 
contianues to predomi nate procurement by the Japanese. 'for example, in 
6. These development compani es were establ ished in  the late 1960s 
and early 1970s: Miatsui Petroleum Development (July 1969), Miatsubi shi 
Petroleum Development ( February 1972), Sumiatomo Petroleum Development
(January 1973), Fuyo Petroleum Development ( February 1973), World 
Energy Development ( February 1973), Toyo Petroleum Development
( February 1973), Central Energy ( February 1973)a. 
7. In variaous artiacles and government documents "autonomous 
development" is confused with another term, "Development-Import" 
pattern. According to one Mill offici al '' Develaopment-Import" i s  a 
category of procurement whiach consiasts of loan-tiaed and "autonomous 
development" as used in  thias paper. The term "autonomous development,a" 
i s  used as it  i s  i n  Mill's Whi te Paper to avoid confusion ( Uraki , 1969). 
' 
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1977 about 381 of copper ore and 901 of bauxite imports were simpl e 
purchases. Simpl e purchases al low the buyer great flexibility in 
seltecting sources as long as the resource market is stable. The lack of 
any involtvements such as loans or investments makes it reltatively 
riskless (Tamaki, 1971, p. 361). However, supply voltume is not 
necessarily guaranteed, even with a long-tem contract, because of 
production fluctuations and changing market situations.t8 Furthermore, 
prices are uncontrol labl e as they depend on the resource market and the 
behavior of the international mineral industry. Thus, this type of 
resource procurement is rel atively "unreliable" with regard to price and 
voltume (MITI, 1971 , p. 97). 
The second type of purchase is the "l oan-tied purchase, "  which 
assures preferential access to natural resources in exchange· for 
expltoration and develtopment l oans for specific projects. Unlike the 
"simpl e purchase, • in which the buyer has no control over sel lers, the 
l oan-tied purchase guarantees supply for certain stipulated periods at a 
favorabl e price as repayment for the loan (Tsurumi, 1976b, pp. 41 -42) . 
This pattern also has l ong-term drawbacks similtar to market purchases, 
uncertainty regarding volume and price. The creditor has l ittle voice 
in the production and management of development projects, i.e., no 
possibility of securing profits nor of management participation (Tamaki, 
197 1 ,  p. 361). 
To avoid the disadvantages of the above, "autonomous develtopment" 
scheme has been preferred. "Autonomous development" (Jishu Kaihatsu) 
means that Japanese participate in both develtopment and production 
through equity or portfolio investment, and then purchase the products. 
Though investors bear the risk and the burden of huge capital 
requirements, they secure "autonomy" in production; that is, they 
control voltume and price, and altso reap the profits of integration from 
8. In 1966 when the copper ore market was tight , about 101 of 
Japan's contracted supply was cut by international copper companies 
(MITI  , 1971, p. 87) .  
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the mine to industri al use (Saito, 1969, pp . 32-34). This type of 
procurement ensures the integration of the mi neral company from 
production to refining; this also ensures competiti veness 
i nternationally as well as among the domestic companies (Hori koshi , 
1971, p. 160). Furthermore, thi s  type of procurement and loan-related 
investment serve to increase exports of Japanese products such as 
project machitnery and building materi als. 
Of seventy-one on-going Japanese affiliated projects in non­
ferrous mi nerals in  1977, fourteen were of the loan-tied purchase type 
and fourteen were "autonomous development" projectst. The others were 
only in the exploration stage (Aihara, 1980, p. 259). Autonomously 
developed projects accounted for 9 . 8% of total crude o i l  imports in  
1970, and i n  1974, 5 .9% of total copper ore and ingot i mports, 7 . 3% of 
zinc ore and ingot i mports, and 3. 9% of bauxi te and aluminum i mports 
(Mill, 1980, p. 247 ) .  
3 .  THE DEVELOPMENT OF JAPANESE OVERSEAS RESOURCE POLICY 
The peri od from the early 1950s to the earl y 1970s can be divided 
i nto three periods on the basis  of changing polticies towards overseas 
resource extraction by both government and pritvate industryt. 
Early 1950s to the Mid 1950s, 
By the mid 1950s Japan emerged as a processor of raw materials, 
most of which were i mported from abroad. The share of i mports i n  the 
total consumption of key resources in 1951 was : copper (18'), zinc 
(Of.), i ron ores (47�), and oil {90.0%). Japanese government policy was 
largely aimed at encouragi ng domestic mining .  Overseas procurement was 
through simple market purchases from foreign companies ,  except for a 
portion of iron ore and copper. 
Efforts in  overseas resource development ,  mostly of iron ore and 
copper, had been begun by Japanese mining companies .  Total Japanese 
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overseas direct investment in the period from 1950 to 1957 included 134 
ventures, of which twenty-five were mining and oil projects; total 
investments were $17 million (Tsurumi, 1976b, p. 38; Oaimon, 1963, p. 
9). The iron ore development projects began in 1951, mainly in India, 
and copper extraction was begun in the Philippines in 1953 by the copper 
companies. In the case of the Philippines a loan for plant imports from 
Japan was extended in exchange for purchases of copper ores 
(Takebayashi, 1963, pp. 112-113). The project pattern, however, was not 
of equity participation but of loan-tied purchases from developed mines. 
The projects during this period were small in scale, concentrated 
in Southeast Asia where the companies took advantage of pre-war 
connections and geographical proximity. Except in the few cases of iron 
ore development in India, the government was not directly involved in 
overseas extractive activities. Thus the resource policy was rather 
passive and opportunistic in character (Jukagaku-Kogyo, 1976, p. 
160). 
Mid 1950s to the Mid 1960s 
During this period, Japanese companies began to participate in 
overseas extractive activities. Between 1958 and 1966, seventy-two 
projects were begun with a total investment of approximately $366 
million (See Table 1 1 1-2). These projects included not only iron ore 
development, but also copper and other non-ferrous metal extraction. 
The copper companies actively took part in exploration and development. 
After securing access to Southeast Asian sources through project loans 
in the late 1950s and early 1960s, especially in the Philippines, they 
commenced mining projects in Latin America. In 1957, for example, 
Nippon Mining purchased the Portecello Copper mine in Chile, initiating 
their first full-fledged post-World War II development project. By 
1965, a few other copper mines were developed by Japanese copper 
companies in Bolivia (1960) and Peru (1963, 1965). These were small in 
scale (2000-5000 tons/year), but they set the pattern for "autonomous 
development" schemes, which would become more frequent in the late 
59,900 
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TABLE 1 1 1 ·2  
IESOJRCE•OII ENTED OVERSEAS INVESTMENTS Of JAPAN, 1951·t1974 
Nw::ber of Projects Equity Invested (SOOOs) 
Tillber Mining Tillber Mining 
TotalYear ind Pulp ,nd Oil Tot•l end Pulp pd Oj l 
1951- 1957 3 25 28 15,556 17,176 32,732 
1958-1959 1 9 10 33,291 24,658 57,949 
1960- 1961 10 15 2S 1,697 148,716 150,413 
1962-1963 2 15 17 9,337 69,237 
1964-1965 3 16 19 14,284 • 54,580 68,864 
1966 5 17 22 36,419 n,1,1 108,566 
1967 4 14 ,a 2,360 58,625 60,985 
1968 5 15 20 17,280 158,681 175,961 
1969 6 31 37 3,315 297,301 300,616 
1970 14 53 73,815 234,955 317,710 
1971 14 33 49,270 228,592 277,862 
1972 29 26 55 34,474 917,386 951,860 
1973 79 61 140 66,396 511t,218 575,614 
1974 52 67 119 61,000 466,000 527,000 
Total 227 312 610 418,494 3,256,945 3,675,429 
Source: Adopted froa T1ur1.11i (1976b). 
originally froa NIT I ,  Njhon Kiavo no Katus1itgi Jenk1i, Tatyo, 1974. 
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1960s. In 1959 Sumitomo Metal Co. partici pated i n  the Bethlehem copper 
mi ne i n  Canada, producing 10, 000-25, 000 tons/year, with a 301 equity 
position and bearing 52% of development cost. 
After 1960 the mi ni ng companies introduced i nternally fi nanced 
large-scale loan-related projects. For i nstance, i n  1965 loan-related 
purchases from the Rio Blanco Copper Mine in  Chile were contracted by 
• 
Sumiatomo Metal Mining, Ni ppon Mini ng Co. , and Mi tsubi shi Metal Mini ng. 
These three companies advanced 11. 5 billion yen as part of a 56. 5 
billion yen development project i n  exchange for 44, 000 tons/year of 
copper ore (0£, Dec. 1970, p.  40). Thias was the first large cooperative 
project that included three mi neral companiaes. Its success prompted a 
successi on of si mi larly organized projects in  later years. 
Si multaneously, thi s  cooperative pattern was encouraged by MITI to 
promote overseas mineral extracti on. The instrument for this promoti on 
was the Overseas Mineral Resource Development Company, whiach was 
establiashed i n  1962 (f/#J, Nov. 1971, p. 87). In thias manner Japanese 
compani es increasi ngly became i nvolved i n  copper extracti on .  Imports 
from captive sources increased to 61 of total imports. The addi tiaon of 
loan-ti ed purchases brought thi s to 251 of total i mports i n  1965 (Kei zai 
Shingi kai , 1969, p. 87). 
Other mi nerals such as lead, zi nc, bauxiate and niackel were mostly 
purchased on the open market. Very few projects had Japanese corporate 
partici patiaon. For example, only 778 million yen was invested in  the 
explorati on and development of z inc and lead projects i n  Thaialand, 
Mexico, and Peru from 1958 to 1965 (Jukagaku-Kogyo, 1976, p .  170). 
The Japanese particiopated i n  ni ckel projects only i n  Indonesi a  with an 
i nvestment of 486 miallion yen between 1963 and 1965 (Jukagaku-
Kogyo, 1976, p.  210). 
In the late 1950s a few ventures in  oil development were conducted 
by the Japanese. The Arabian Oil  Company was formed i n  1958 by forty 
companies representing the "Zaiokaio" group, i ncludi ng electric  utili ti es, 
steel, tradi ng companiaes, and banks, and they acqui red exploration 
• 
l • 
• 
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rights in the neutral zone of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.9 Oil imports 
from fields discovered and developed by this project began in 1961 and 
supplied about 9% of total crude oil imports by early 1970. This was 
the first case of post-WWII autonomously developed crude oil production 
(Yoshino, 1976, pp. 58-61).10 MIT I helped the company develop a market 
in Japan through administrative measures under the Petroleum Industry 
Law as most refiners were tied to foreign companies (Watanabe, 1975, p .  
267). In  1960 the North Sumatra Oil Development Cooperation Company 
(NOSOOECO) was formed as an operating company by the Japanese government 
with OECF funds after an agreement with the Indonesian government was 
reached. Repayment for an 18 billion yen credit would be in crude oil 
supplied by the Indonesian state oil company, Permina.t11 
These two projects stimulated other oil refiners and development 
companies to seek similar opportunities. In 1964 Teikoku Sekiyu Co. 
started exploration in Sabah (Malaysia) by creating the Sabah Teiseki 
Oil Company. In 1966 Petroleum Resource Development Corporation 
obtained exploration concessions 1n Canada, Australia and Indonesia, and 
created an operating company for each project.t12 The number of oil 
projects started in this period was small but they occupied an important 
position later as suppliers of "self-developed" crude oilt. 
The procurement pattern from the mid 1950s to the mid 1960s was, 
with the exception of the oil projects, still small scale and sporadic. 
9. The project was begun at the initiation of one Japanese 
entrepreneur, Taro Yamashita (Yoshino, 1976, pp. 58-62). 
10. The concession agreement with Saudi Arabia and Kuwait 
offered, to each government, better terms { 56� and 57� profit, 
respectively) than those of major international oil companies and 
resulted in significant changes in the prevailing pattern of concession 
terms in the international oil industry { Penrose, 1968, pp. 136-137) . 
11 . See, the Indonesian case in Section IV. 
12 . The Petroleum Resource Development Corporation was a half 
government-owned exploration company, which was initially established in 
1955 for domestic exploration. 
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Large international companies continued to control the mining and 
marketing system throughout the world. Japanese mineral companies, • 
l acking in infomation and technology, had few opportunities to secure 
access to l arge, promising deposits. For example, copper projects were 
motivated by domestic competition and based on capital raised by 
individual companies and, therefore, tended to be rather smal l.  Oil 
projects were not systematical ly  developed, but ·rather pursued 
opportunities develtoped by individual entrepreneurs which the government 
and industries expltoited. Each of these oil projects was usual l y  funded 
by a group of consumer industries or "Zaika i "  groups, sometimes with 
governmental funds. Separate companies were set up for each of the 
projects. This "one company-one project• styl e of operation was 
prevalent among ventures of this period (Okamoto, 1980, pp. 175-180). 
In this period neither the government nor industry were prepared to 
undertake l arge-scal e overseas mineral resource development projects. 
There were, also, external factors that constrained procurement 
strategies . Throughout the l ate 1950s and earl y 1960s the fl ow of 
resources through the production and marketing mechanisms of major 
international mineral and oil companies was relatively smooth. The 
price of oil and mineral s was stabl e and l ow until 1965 and increased 
efficiencies in transport such as super-tankers l owered overal l cost 
(Keizai Shingikai, 1969, p .  8). This enabled importers to acquire • 
supplies without major constraints and made Japanese mineral companies 
l ess interested in risky overseas ventures .  
Late 19§0s to the Early 1970s 
Resource procurement policies changed rapidl y during this period. 
Increased demand and the accompanying increased dependence on foreign 
sources compel l ed Mill and private companies to recognize the necessity 
of develtoping independent procurement polticies. The strategy adopted 
was to enormously increase foreign investment (loan as well as equity 
participation) ,  not onl y in oil develtopment, but in mining projects as 
weltl .  In 1967 to 1973, S2 . 4  bil l ion was invested in 218 mineral and oil 
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development projects (see Table 1 1 1-2). This enormous increase in 
investment transformed resource procurement patterns. 
First, the scale of Japanese participation grew larger. Between 
1951 and 1965 the average investment per year, including loans to all 
mineral-related projects with the exception of oil, was 1 . 5  billion yen; 
between 1965-1970 it rose to 22.3 billion yen and to 80 billion yen 
between 1970-1975 (Jukagaku-Kogyo, 1970, pp. 45-46)  . This 
reflected not only an increase in number, but also the growth in the 
scale of projects in which Japan took part. For example,tin 1958 
Mitsubishi Metal and Mining Co. advanced a 1.5 billion yen loan to the 
Sipalay Copper Mine (Philippines). By the late 1960s Japanese copper 
companies extended 5.9 billion yen and 19.5 billion yen loans to the Fox 
and Lonex Mines in Canada, respectivelyt. Furthermore, the distribution 
of projects spread from Southeast Asia and Latin America to Africa, the 
Middle East, Australia, the U.S. and Canada. 
Second, in conjunction with the expansion of scale, the number of 
participants in each project increased. Unlike the previous period when 
a single company usually was responsible for each project, cooperation 
among metal companies became more co11111on. For instance, copper projects 
which began in the late 1960s, such as the Brenda Hine (Canada), the 
Ertsberg Mine (Indonesia) , and the Lonex Mine (Canada), included 
participation by groups of two to twelve companies (0£, July 1969, p. 
40). A pattern of both horizontal cooperation (between smelters) and 
vertical cooperation (between smelter and consumer companies) emerged. 
Nickel development projects in the Philippines and Indonesia and a 
chrome exploration project in Kenya (Nippon Kokan Co., Kokan Mining 
Co. and C. Itoh & Co.) are examples of the participation of Japanese 
steel companies under the coordination of the mineral companies. This 
cooperation was necessary as the mineral projects were generally too 
costly and large-scale to be undertaken by an individual company. 
Trading companies also joined as investors and creditors. As 
mentioned earlier, the trading companies acted as both project-organizer 
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and go-betweens in mineral sales. In addition to these services they 
increasingly invested in  or extended loans to these projects. The 
involvement of the trading compani es was already prevalent in  the 
ferrous metals, but now extended to the non-ferrous metals , also. The 
trading company Nissho Iwai , for example , i s  a 5 percent partner wi th 
Japanese copper smelters in copper development in Zai re (formerly the 
Congo).· Mi tsui & Co. and Mi tsubishi Corp. lent the Anglo-Ameriecan Corp. 
about $70 million for development of Zambian copper deposits in exchange 
for 100,e000 tons of copper a year for 10 years (£/HJ, November 1971e, pp. 
90-93). Trading firms increasingly played a central role i n  overseas 
mineral ventures. 
Finally, government support through the ff4DPC, the Export-Import 
Bank, and OECF succeeded in realizi ng large-scale mining operatieons. An 
example of this  i s  the Musoshi Copper Mine development in the Congo, 
contracted in  1968. Five major Japanese metal mi ning compani es (Nippon 
Mining, Sumietomo Metal Mining , Mitsui Mining, Furukawa Mining and 
Toho Z inc} and one tradi ng firm (Nissho Iwai) created SODEMICO 
(Congo Mi ning and Industry Development Co.) wh ich held ass of equity 
parti cipati on in  a joi nt venture with the Congo Government. The OECF 
had suppli ed explorati on funds to the project. The MMOPC underwrote the 
credits to allow the Japanese firms to secure fi nanci ng from connercial 
banks in  addition to the Export- Import Bank (Sakurai ,  1972) . The mine 
commenced production in 1972 and has been exporti ng 54,e000 tons of ore 
to Japan yearly. 
A similar trend was observable in oil explorati on and development. 
Unlike the sporadi c  project participation in  the previeous period, more 
ambitious projects were attempted by Japanese compani es in the late 
1960s. First, the number of Japanese fims engaged in oil exploration 
and/or producteion increased from 8 in 1967 to 43 in 1974. Trading 
compani es and affiliated financial groups , such as Mitsub ishie, Mitsui 
and Sumitomo , which had not particiepated i n  oil development earli er ,  
became involved in  overseas oil projects through the formateion of oil 
development compani es (Okamoto, 1980, p. 178). These o il  compani es 
• 
70 
financed oil ventures and operated as both holding companies and actual 
producers. Japanese non-foreign affiliated refineries, which had nott· 
been involved in overseas oil ventures, also initiated overseas oil 
development projects. For example, Nippon Kogyo, Maruzen Sekiyu and 
Daikyo Sekiyu cooperated to set up Abu Dhabi Oil Co. in 1968 which 
became the 4th Japanese "independent" oil source (Wu, 1977, pp. 62-72).  
During the period between 1968 and 1971, sometimes referred to as "the 
First Oil Development Boom," new projects were undertaken, not only in 
the Middle East and Asia, but also in Africa and Latin America (Okamoto, 
1980, pp. 169-178). 
Second, the increased number of firms contributed to a rapid 
increase in exploration and development expenditures. In 1958 and 1959, 
the annual investment in oil development was 3.9 and 3.1 billion yen 
respectively. In 1968 it rose to 21. 3 billion yen and by 1972 it had 
risen to 113.6 billion yen (Wu, 1977, p. 66).  
Third, cooperation between PDPC and Japanese firms was cemented by 
governmental financial assistance to the various projects. PDPC usually 
financed approximately SOS of the total individual project expenditure ; 
the remainder was supplied by private firms. In 1967, the first year of 
operation, PDPC's investments and loans totaled 800 miJtlion yen. By 
1972 it had risen to 23 billion yen, of which, 19. 1 billion yen was 
investment and the remainder in the form of loans (see Table 1 1 1-1). 
From 1967 to 1974, forty of sixty-two projects were financed by PDPC 
(see Table 1 1 1-3). These "national" projects, coordinating both the 
government and private oil development firms, became the prevalent 
pattern in oil development projects (Jukagaku-Kogyo, 1976, p. 75).  
, 7 1  
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TABLE 1 1 1-3 
CUMULATIVE NUMBER OF PROJECTS OF JAPANESE OIL 
COMPANIES BY REGION 
Financed by PDPC Not Financed by PDPC 
Discon­ Discon­
Region Ongoing tinued Total Ongoing tinued Total 
Southeast Asia 12 1 13 8 1 9 
Middle East 5 3 8 1 - 1 
Africa 3 2 5 3 - 3 
Oceania 1 4 5 2 - 2 
North America 1 2 3 2 - 2 
Sourth America 4 2 6 4 1 5 
Total 26 14 40 20 2 22 
Source : Outline of Japanese Petroleum Development Corpt. 
(January 1975)t, p .  12 . 
In sumary, before the mid 1960s Japanese resource policy was 
confined to simple purchasest. Other types of arrangements were 
relatively unimportant in this period. After the mid-1960s the Japanese 
government and mineral companies participated more actively in the 
international production and supply system through loans and investment . 
The objective was to secure a low-cost, stable supply of resources for 
the growing Japanese economy. This much more active resource policy 
reflected the government ' s, Mill ' s  new policies for encouraging overseas 
resource ventures. The establishment of PDPC and reinforcement of ttlDPC 
in 1967 embodied Mill's policy concern. Governmental aid to producer 
countries or, through OECF, to the enterprises, complemented the policy 
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efforts of private companies. Private companies, which were concerned 
about resource supplaies, but operated under technolaogical and capital 
constraints, were encouraged and stimulaated by MITI 's  pol icy measures. 
In this sense, 1967, the year in which the governmental institutions 
were created, may be considered as a benchmark in the historical 
develaopment of Japanese resource policy (Wu, 1977, p .  63). 
Al so, the changing international environment affected domestical l y  
develaoped resource polaicies. The rise of nationalaism in develaoping 
countries and the rela tive declaine in the power of international mineral 
and oil industries in the worlad resource system created uncertainty 
regarding resource production and supply. The changing resource 
situation gave the producing countries a better bargaining position with 
the international resource corporations. This created concern in Japan, 
but alaso opened new opportunities for Japanese companies. This was 
because the producing countries had insufficient indigenous capital to 
devel op their resources autonomousl y and sought foreign capital . The 
producing countries were ablae to pl ay the international oil and mineral 
industries against the Japanese to get better terms {Bosson and Varon, 
1977, p. 94) .  This was true in the case of the Arabian Oil project in 
which the Japanese offered very favorabl e financing terms, significantl y 
better than those offered by the l arge oil companies {Ozawa, 1978; 
Tanzer, 1980, p. 78). 
There was a simil ar declaine in power among the international metal 
companies. A copper project, such as Musoshi in the Congo, became 
possiblae because the mines, formerl y owned by Union Miniere by Belgium, 
were seized by the Congo government in 1967 and offered to Japanese 
companies. This type of environment was favorablae for the operation of 
Japanese "resource diplaomacy.a" 
Final l y, the rise of the Japanese economy after 1965 gave Japanese 
companies the requisite capital and technolaogy to become more active in 
overseas enterprises. Especialal y  important were the trading companies 
which were ablae to raise capital and had access to information (£/HJ, 
, 
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November 1971, p. 92). A favorabl e baltance of payments and a massive 
inflow of foreign exchange when Nixon devalued the dol l ar in 1971 
further increased Japanese abiltities to invest in foreign countries 
(Miyazaki , 1974).t13 
• 
13 .  Massive increases of investment in oil and mineral projects are 
noticeablte after 1971. See, Tabl e 1 1 1 -2 .  
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IV  
Resource Policy Toward Southeast Asian Countrites 
I. AN OVERVIEW OF RELATIONS WITH SOUTHEAST AS IAN COUNTRIES 
The relationship between Japan and Southeast Asia  has a long 
hi story of cultural as well as polititco- economic contacts (Yano, 1975). 1 
Relatitons between Japan and Southeast Asia countries in the post-war 
i nternati onal pol itics and economics in the region as well as the world. 
The central issue relates to the reasons why Japan had an opportuni ty to 
return to the region so soon after its withdrawal after defeat in WWII .  
An important factor was the development of the ''Cold War" i n  Asia  
between the Uni ted States and the then uni fied "Communi st Bloc". The 
rise of the People ' s  Republic of China, the Korean War and the confli cts 
in Indochina fostered concern among U. S .  pol icy-makers regardi ng the 
spread of "communi sm" in Asia. U.S . policy toward Japan changed from 
management to the more active one of fostering Japan as an economi cally 
stable power i n  the region and rebuilding Japan as a "li nch-pi n" agaitnst 
''tcommunism'' ( Lach and Wehrle, 1975 , Ch. 4). For Japan , whi ch lost the 
Chinese market, i t  was considered necessary to regain access to 
Southeast Asi a  (SEA} not only as market but also as a source of raw 
materi als for Japanese industri es (Gay, 1952). 2 As a result, before the 
reparati on negotiation began in 1951 , Japanese government and pritvate 
industri es had already considered SEA as an area for Japanese economi c  
activi ti es ( Hara, 1980b, p .  1 54) and the U.S. gave taci t  consent to 
Japanese i nvolvement in the regiton. The reparation payments to SEA 
countr ies promoted these interests and boosted the Japanese economy by 
The term "Southeast Asia" i ncludes all of the ASEAN countries :  
Indonesi a ,  the Phi lippines , Thai land , Malaysia,  S i ngapore 
Burma (techni cally not a member of ASEAN). 
2. In 1935 Chitna's share of Japanese exports was 18%, Korea 17% 
and Taitwan 7% (Yamamoto, 1978, p. 93). 
as well as 
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encouraging the trade and activities of private companies (Yanaga, 1968, 
Ch. 8 ;  Hasegawa , 1975, pp. 46-52)  . 
In the 1960s, in cooperation with the U. S. Asia policy , Japan 
became more deeply involved in Southeast Asia. As the U.S. fought the 
Vietnam War, Japan extended economic aid to politically and 
ideologically friendly governments. This aid simultaneously prompted 
the growth of Japanese foreign direct investment and exports to the 
region (Halliday, 1973, pp . 25-31). Especially after the mid 1960s , 
Japan increased its capital investment and economic aid enormously, at 
the same time that the U.S. was unable , due to economic constraints ,  to 
maintain its traditional economic relationship with SEAt. Japan 
undertook part of this role and thereby expended its economic influence 
throughout the area (Kawata, 1972 ). This historical development created 
an asy11111etrical relationship between Japan and Southeast Asian 
countries .  This relationship was developed in three fields of economic 
interaction : trade, foreign direct investment and governmental aid. 
In trade relations SEA, as a regiont, has been an important market 
for Japanese products as well as a supplier of natural resources to 
Japant, although its importance as both a market and supplier is 
decreasing.3 For example, in 1972 Southeast Asian countries purchased 
nearly 12% of total Japanese exports and supplied 16% of total imports 
(MITIt, 1975b, p. 130)t. However , each countriest' share has been a small 
percentage (about 2%) of total Japanese trade, with the exception of 
Indonesia from which Japan imports crude oil. On the other hand , Japan 
held an increasing share of their trade . As Table IV-1 indicates ,  in 
1974 Japan was the most important export market for Indonesia, Thail and, 
and Malaysia, and also the most significant source of imports for the 
SEA countries. Japan has a far greater role in Southeast Asia's trade 
than Southeast Asia has in Japan's .  
3. Southeast Asia's market share decreased from 44.4% in 1950 of 
total Japanese exports to 22 .9% in 1974. The imports from Southeast 
Asia also declined from 25.9% of Japanese total imports in 1950 to 20% 
in 1974 (MITI , 1974b). 
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545 
(59. 1 )  
1 ,529 
(53.4) 974 
TABLE IV· 1 
ECONOMIC RELAT1IONS WITM ASEAN COUNTRIES (1974) 
lnvest•ent (cases. value*> Ia.porter (1974 � £,cporter (1974> Official Develop. Assistance 
(S ■i l l  ion) (S ■i l l ion) ( 1974) ($000&) 
Japan U,S, Jpn u.s. Japan U.S. w. Ger. Japan U.S. W.Ger. Tota\ 
1, 133 924 829 37,320 46,000Phil1ippines 
(34.91) (42.41) (26.8%) (24. 1%) (28.31) (34.U) 325 169 82.3 68.1 
18 643Thai land 631 196 987 424 17,370 18,000 175 
54 3,818(25.6) (7.9) (31.9) (13.7) (28.0) (29.0) 1 ,563 
Malaysia 714 S95 916 397 36,260 4,000 3,780 
(9.6) (6.5) (6.2) 118 81 38 604( 14.0) c22.o,(16.9) 
• •  1 , 110 638 776 1 ,  133 3,540Singerc,re 
( 1 1 .6) (14. 1)  (17.8) (13.2) (15.2) (4.8) 299 1,028 1 13 2,869 
lndaMsia 3,969 1,580 1 ,135 611 221,090 82,000 57,650 181 124 29 771 
(21.3) <29.S) (15.9) (41.2) (15.3) (10.8) 1,083 166 3,878 
•value in national currency except in the cases of Phil ippines and Indonesia which are in US S, ell  figures are in ■i l l  ions. 
Source: Adopted frOII K••kura (1976). p. 326. 
Originally frOII NITtI ,  TMho Nlkysho. 
• 
MITI, Keizailcyorvoku !!2 Genio to MMdaitten. 
JETRO, KtiHi Shi io Nakusho. 
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The trade between Japan and SEA has been composed of Japan's 
export of finished goods and basic industrial products and Japan's 
import of primary products, such as food stuffs and raw materieals. In 
accordance w ith the traditieonal evolution of development from i nput 
substi tution to export-oriented industri ali zation followed by SEA 
countr ies, Japan exported capital goods and basic i ndustri al products as 
well as consumer goods. In return , primary goods were exported by those 
countries to earn forei gn exchange (Kokusai Kaiehatsu Senti, 1978, pp. 
46-79). For instance i n  1971 88. 8 percent (91. 0 percent i n  1976) of 
Japan's  exports to SEA were compri sed of manufactured goods, while 86.7 
percent (80 .1  percent in 1976) of imports from SEA were primary goods 
(MITI, 1978, pp. 291-292). 
The imbalance of importance as trading partners and the 
speci alized trade composition illustrates the dependence of SEA 
countries on Japan as a market for primary products and as a suppli er of 
manufactured goods. The relative importance of Japan as a market for 
SEA primary connodit i es weakens these countries' bargai ning position 
wi th regard to both volume and pr ice (See Weinstein, 1976, pp. 379-382). 
Furthermore, fluctuatieons of the purchaser' s  (Japan) economy affects the 
producer ' s  economy; for example , the recession in Japan after the oil 
cri sis  (1974-1975) caused a fall in  co111Rodity exports from SEA and hurt 
the producers.e4 
Imports of Japanese finieshed products such as machi nery and 
consumer goods have poured into the SEA market. This i s  partly because 
the i ndustri al policies of these countri es require the import of capi tal 
goods and i ndustri al raw materi als from Japan. Other factors include 
Japanese capital i nvestment and governmental aid which accompanied and 
facilietated the import of Japanese products (Kamakura, 1976, p. 129) . 
• 
4. In 1975 Indonesia decreased its oil production for the first 
time since 1967 because of a slump in the Japanese market (Nihon 
EnerugT Keizai Kenkyu-jo, 1978, p. 39). 
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Thus, in the field of trade SEA countries are more dependent upon Japan 
than vice versa (Yoshihara, 1974, p .  99) . 
• 
Japan has also dominated private investment in SEA (See Table IV-
1)t. By the end of 1973 Japan became chief investor, exceeding the U. S .  
in Thailand (34. 41 of total cumulative foreign investment), in the 
Philippines (47. 51 of total investment in investment priority sector) 
and in Indonesia (18 .81 of total cumulative foreign direct investment; 
Mill, 1975b, p . 430)t. In the period between 1951 and 1979 SEA absorbed 
$6 billion of Japanese investment or 19 . 11 of total approved foreign 
direct investment, of which, Indonesia's share alone was $3.9 billion, 
or 12 . 21 (MITI, 1981, p .  10)t. Especially in the early 1970s, the annual 
rate of increase of Japanese investment in SEA was over 451, while the 
U.S . and West Germany increased their investment by about 191 and 29�81, 
respectively (MITI, 1975b, pp . 422-423)t. 
Japanese foreign investment in the region has largely been 
concentrated in manufacturing, mining and oil-related venturest. By the 
end of 1979 investment in manufacturing and oil and mineral extraction 
amounted to 44. 51 and 32 . SS of the total cumulative investment 1n Asia 
respectively . 35 . 41 of total Japanese world-wi de investment in 
manufacturing and 43 .31 of mining investment were in SEA (MITI, 1981, p .  
14)t. These percentages indicate that not only has SEA been the major 
geographical region of Japanese investment, but also that the extent of 
Japanese capital involvement in SEA has been massive, especially since 
the late 1960s. 
The various parties to these large investments have obviously been 
motivated by different factors; both the host countries and the 
companies are pursuing different objectives. The Japanese 110tives 
include the high labour and land cost in Japan, the changing industrial 
structure in Japan, and tariff barriers on Japanese products in the 
foreign markets which encourage Japanese manufacturing companies to seek 
investment opportunities inside the tariff barriers (Yoshihara, 1978 ; 
Ozawa, 1979)t. As will be examined later, investment in the oil and 
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mi ni ng sector has been chiaefly motiavated by the desiare to secure stable 
low-cost resources. 
· The i nvestment i ncentiave of Japanese companies has been further 
i ncreased by the economi c development policies of Southeast Asian 
governments. These governments have actively sought foreiagn capiatal for 
their i mport substiatutiaon and export-oriaented industri alizatiaon polici es 
i n  the 1960s and the 1970s (Tambunlertchai ,  1977, pp. 65-75). As 
i nvestment by the U.S. slowed down, Japan became the main  source of 
capiatal (Priangle, 1980, p. 123; Weiansteian, 1976, pp. 383-384)a. Thias has 
resulted in  Japanese capital becoming predomianant i n  these countriaes. 
Consequently, Japanese capital has acquiared influence over the 
local economiaes. Through equity or loan partici pation Japanese 
compani es obtained leverage i n  the operati on of joint ventures as well 
as loan-related companiaes (Tsuda, 1978). Furthermore, the expansion of 
Japanese capi tal i n  some sectors such as the Indonesi an textile 
i ndustry, inhibited the growth of indi genous capital ( Palmer, 1978, Ch. 
4). 5 Although, on one hand, Japanese i nvestment has been an obstacle to 
the development of native capital, on the other, SEA policy-makers were 
yet obli ged to invi te in foreign capiatal. Their development plans are 
based on the use of foreign capiatal to supplement capiatal and technology 
defici encies ( Palmer, 1978, p. 181). Japanese forei gn investment 
helped create a situati on in  whi ch SEA governments had liattle choice but 
to rely on Japanese capiatal. 
The Japanese economic penetration of SEA, in  the form of trade and 
investment, was encouraged through bialateral aid to these countri es and 
the simultaneously i ncreased government i nvolvement in  priavate 
activities i n  the recipient countries. In 1976 Japan provi ded 
approxiamately 47� of total ODA to SEA countriaes (Mil l ,  1977). Those 
countries receiaved such a large share of Japanese ODA due to priavate 
5. Palmer emphasizes the uneven sectoral development caused by
foreign i nvestment. 
, 
81  
Japanese coa•ercial interests in the area. More than other countries, 
Japan's aid is concentrated in project aid, which provides the 
infrastructure for the operation of Japanese companies. As reparation 
payments were effective in promoting the development of exports, 
Japanese government "aid,t" in the form of tied loans or project aid, has 
similarly increased not only the trade with Japan but also the economic 
"leverage" of Japanese investors in the recipient countries by 
supplementing their activities (Mortimer, 1973, p. 56). 
In 1973t-74 Japan became the chief donor to Indonesia and Malaysia, 
exceeding the U.S., and one of the primary donors to the Philippines, 
Thailand and Singapore (See Table IV-1). SEA government officials, 
whose intention was to supplement domestic capital shortages with 
foreign capital, require bilateral aid in order to continue their 
development policies. Dependence on foreign aid also prevents domestic 
capital formation. The interest burden puts pressure on the recipients, 
reinforcing aid dependence and increasing the drain on the economy 
caused by the service and repayment of debts (Palmer, 1978, Ch. 3). 
Thus , Japanese aid has intens1fied the asy11111etrical relations that 
already existed due to trade and foreign investment. 
The asymmetrical relationship between Japan and Southeast Asian 
countries existed in trade, foreign investment and governmental a id .  
Weinstein has termed this asymetrical relationship as the "dependence" 
of the SEA countries on Japan. Japanese can exert great leverage to 
further economic goals through the use of this dependence (Weinstein, 
1976, p. 378). This dependent relationship presents the background 
against which Japanese resource policies have been deployed in the post­
war period. 
2. SOUTHEAST ASIAN COUNTRIES AS RESOURCE SUPPLIERS : CASE STUDIES 
The extraction of SEA resources by the Japanese is not only a 
post-war phenomenat. In the 1930s the growing Japanese military economy 
increased Japanese interest in overseas resource extraction. As the war 
• 
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in China intensified and Chinese resource production (especially iron 
ore) became unstable, Japan came to view SEA as a promising alternative 
source. In the 1930s approximately 30S of Japanese investment in SEA 
was in the mining sector, another SOS went into plantations producing 
crops such as rubber and jute (Sakiyama, 1963, p. 18). 
On the Malay Peninsula, iron-ore mining, which began in the early 
1920s, was expanded rapidly in the 1930s by the mining companies. Tin, 
manganese, and bauxite were also produced in Malaya. Gold, copper and 
manganese were mined in the Philippines and in the Dutch East Indies 
copper was mined. These activities were conducted by Japanese mining 
companies such as Ishihara Sangyo and Nippon Mining. Furthermore, oil 
production was carried out by a joint venture of Nihon Sekiyu and Mitsui 
Trade Co. in the Dutch East Indies (Takebayashi, 1963, pp. 85-91). 
After WWII the proximity of SEA ensured that it would be viewed as 
an important source of minerals for the resumption of Japanese resource 
extraction activities. The success of the Chinese Revolution meant that 
Japan lost its sources in China. This prompted Japan to turn its 
attention to SEA. The previously discussed development of relations 
with the countries of Southeast Asia, as well as geographical proximity 
were very important factors 1n encouraging the Japanese to resume 
resource extraction activities in the region. 
This section examines the development of the Japanese resource 
policies discussed in the previous section, in the specific Southeast 
Asian countries. The various participants and their particular policies 
towards mineral (copper, nickel, and bauxite) and oil exploration and 
development will be examined. SEA is examined as a case study because 
by 1972 241 of resource-related Japanese foreign investment had gone 
into SEA. Only the Middle East was a more important regiont, receiving 
40.1%t, almost entirely for oil ; in SEA investment was for oil and other 
minerals. In addition, Japanese extractive companies started 
participating in Southeast Asian resource development relatively early 
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in the postwar period, making it possible to trace policy developments 
for the entire period from 1950 through the mid 1970s.6 
Indonesia 
Indonesia is endowed with many commercially exploitable mineral 
and petroleum deposits due to its geological historye. Although a 
complete geological survey has not yet been done, Indonesia has the 
greatest resource endowment in SEA (Hunter, 1968 , pp : 73-89). Minerals, 
especially oil, are Indonesia ,s major export commodity. 011  alone has 
earned enormous amounts of foreign exchange, especially after the 1973 
oil crisis. The share of petroleum in total Indonesian exports rose 
from 25 percent in 1973 to 64 percent in 1978 (Indonesiae, 1980)e. If 
other minerals and LNG (Liquified Natural Gas) are included, the share 
of mineral exports amounts to approximately 72% of total exports. In 
addition to being a source of foreign exchange , minerals, especially 
oil, are an important a source of tax revenue and as collateral for 
borrowing from foreign banks. The importance of the mineral sector has 
6 .  Malaysia , Thailand and Indonesia have been important tin 
producers. In 1979, these three countries produced 25%, 14% and 10% of 
world tin ore production and 28%, 13% and 1 1% of world smelted tin, 
respectively. In their economies the tin industry has been significante. 
For example, in Malaysia tin was one of the major export commodities, 
overshadowed only by rubber and palm oile, accounting for 131 of total 
export value in 1975. In Thailande, tin accounted for 5% of exports in 
1975 (valued at $ 1 10  million) and the primary mineral export coR111odity 
except for crude oil (Wang, 1978). These three countries are Japan' s  
major suppliers of tin, providing 97 . 1% of total Japanese tin imports in 
1975e. 
This study of Japanese resource policy toward SEA excludes tin in spite 
of its relative importance to their economies for the following reasonse. 
First, the Japanese regard tin as less significant than the other non­
ferrous minerals : copper, bauxite and nickel. None of the Mill 
documents ever mentioned the necessity of a policy to guarantee tin 
supplies. This lack of interest is due to tin 's  lack of importance in 
industrial production. Second, the Japanese have not engaged in tin 
development, except for a few small-scale smelting enterprises in 
Malaysia , due to tin's  industrial insignificance. {PIN, 1972, 309: 248-
254; PIN, 1973 , 4-5 : 90-100 ; PIN, 1973 , 4-7: 152-159 ; Wang, 1978)e. 
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prompted the government to maintain close control through the mechanism 
of state corporations (Hunter, 1968, pp. 80-83).7 
Japan has generally been a major market for mineral co11111odities 
produced in Indonesia, importing in 1972 681 of its LNG, 72.8% of its 
crude oil, 99.51 of nickel ore and 94. 31 of bauxite (Jukagaku-Kogyo, 
1976, p. 38). Indonesia has, historically, been the second largest 
supplier of tin, bauxite and nickel to Japan ; in 1979 the Indonesian 
share in total Japanese imports of each of these co11111odities was 20.9%, 
18.51 and 27.51 respectively. As for crude oil, in 1979 Indonesia was 
the second major exporter to Japan, supplying 14.61 of total Japanese 
crude oil imports. It has also been the chief supplier of LNG to Japan, 
supplying 29 . 41 of total LNG imports (MITI, 1980, p. 240). These 
figures suggest that the Japanese government and extractive industries 
are more interested in Indonesia than any other Southeast Asian 
countries. 
Petroleum. The Indonesian oil sector has been of interest to the 
Japanese government and private companies since the late 1950s. The 
first Japanese participation in an oil development project was initiated 
by industrialists who became interested in Sumatran oil during the 
reparations negotiations period of 195 1 - 1957 (See, Nishihara, 1976, pp. 
1 17-121). This first project was to assist the Indonesian state oil 
corporation, Pennina, to rehabilitate former Shell fields in North 
Sumatra in return for crude oil supplies for Japan (Hunter, 1971, p. 
267; Gibson, 1966, pp. 62-63)t. The Japanese partner in the project, the 
North Sumatra Oil Development Cooperation Company (NOSOOECO) was founded 
in June 1960, with paid-in capital of 2, 000 million yen, of which 750 
million yen (37.51) was subscribed by the Japanese government 's OECF, 
141 by Japanese oil refiners, 5% by Petroleum Resource Development 
' 
7. Hunter's article gives an overview of the Indonesian mineral 
industry in 1968, excluding oil and natural gas. The state corporations
which control the mining sector are P.N. Petramina (Oil and Natural 
Gas) , P.N. Tambang Timah (tin), P.N. Tambang Batubara (coal) , P.N. Aneka 
Tambang (other minerals) (Hunter, 1968, p. 82). 
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Corporation (PRDC) (Sekiyu Shigen Kaihatsu Kodan repl aced by PDPC in  
1967 ) and the remainder by Tei koku Sekiyu (Tei koku 011 Co. ) ,  Ishihara , 
Sangyo and others (Cl ark, 1980, p. 68)o. 
The agreement was based on what was cal l ed a production-sharing 
project , not on the joint venture bas i s  wh i ch the Japanese preferred -
(Bartlett et al . ,  1972, p .  290). Among the terms of the project 
agreement was i ncl uded the provis ion for 18,845 mi l l i on yen credi t  from 
the Japanese government over a period of ten years for the purchase of 
equipment , fac i l it ies and servi ces from Japan . The credi t  was to be 
repaid  by Penni na ' s  del i very from NOSODECO of 5 . 6  mi l l i on ki l ol i ters 
(401 of :· e annual output i n  excess of 800,o000 k1 1 1 1 1 ters} over ten 
years . For importi ng and marketing purposes , Penni na (SOS}, NOSODECO 
and a number of other Japanese o i l  companies establ i shed i n  1965 the Far 
Eastern Oil Trading Company in Tokyo. The oi l supply came on- l ine in 
1961 and terminated i n  1973 as agreed . - However, NOSODECO was conti nued 
i n  1974 under a new name, Dai ichi Oi l  Devel opment , and conti nued 
exploration activities.  
The North Sumatra project 1 s  noteworthy for the fol l owi ng reasons.  
F irst , i t  set an example for oil  projects i n  which the Japanese 
government partic ipated through PDPC and OECF in coordinati on with 
private corporat ions. The project was not in it iated by the Japanese 
government or Japanese o i l  refiners but by i ndividual entrepreneurs , who 
had informal contacts i n  Indonesi a  dating from the pre-war period . 
However, government funding was indi spensabl e for real i zation of the 
8project (Bartlett, 1972, pp . 154-158)o.o Second , Japanese yen credi ts 
were uti l i zed as a pol i cy tool to ensure oil  suppl i es ;  simi l ar tact ics 
had been used earl i er to secure iron ore . Thi rd ,  for the Indonesians 
the project was one of the first "production-sharing• arrangements,  
8. Ni sh ijima Sh igetada, who was assigned to the Naval L iai son 
Office in Djakarta during the War, and Kobayashi Ataru , who pl ayed a 
major rol e i n  reparat ions negoti at ions, arranged the fi rst agreements 
between Japanese companies and the Indonesi a  oil  industry (Ni shi hara, 
1976 , Ch . 2 ;  Yanaga, 1968, pp. 222-228). 
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which furthered an increased independence from the major oil companies.9 
This agreement between Japan and Indonesia occurred concomitantly with 
an intensification of Indonesia ' s  nationalistic economic policies.10 
Newcomers in the oil game , such as the Japanese , had greater 
opportunities to conclude oil contracts with the Indonesians during this 
period (Thomas and Panglaykim, 1967, p. 71). Thus, this project can be 
considered an important Japanese avenue into oil development ventures in 
Indonesia. 
By 1974 seven other exploration and development companies had been 
established for oil development projects based on the North Sumatran 
production-sharing formula (See Table IV-2).11 The two companies , the 
Indonesian Petroleum Development Co. and the Sumatra Petroleum Co., 
which were founded on the basis of PDPC and PRDC financing, were joined 
by oil development companies fomed by Keiretsu companies (Clark, 1968 , 
p. 74)t. The companies established in the early 1970s were largely 
composed of these oil development companies and oil refiners (Okamato , 
1980, pp. 163-178). All of these projects were undertaken in 
cooperation with foreign oil companies. Some companies which had 
started independently , sub-contracted part of their exploration rights 
and transferred operating rights to the foreign companies in the 
process. Others participated in on-going projects contracted between 
foreign oil companies and Pertamina through portfolio investment. This 
association with foreign capital was a nomal procedure to spread the 
great risks associated with exploring and developing an oil field. 
9. Production-sharing is usually an arrangement in which a 
foreign creditor provides credits for a specific project and the credits 
are repaid in a stipulated period with an agreed upon percentage of the 
projects' product (Gibson , 1966 p. 53)t. 
10. The Sukarno government took a nationalistic position on the 
nationalization of oil in 1964 and 1965 (Thomas and Panglaykim, 1967 , p. 
. 71). 
11. For examplet, funds for exploration and development were 
provided by Japanese as credits. If the project was successfult, 40% of 
annual production was allocated to repayment of creditst, and the 
remaining 60% was divided : 65% to Indonesia and 35% to Japan . 
• • • • 
(251) 
(SOI) 
7.0 
TABLE IV·2 
JAPANESE Oil EJCPlOIATION ANO DEVELOPIIENT COl>AIIIES IN IIIDONESIA ( 1973) 
Year Capitel Capitel Area Aff i l ietion DevelOfl■ent 
(bi llion Contributor, Stage 
yen) 
Feb. 1966 19.6 
Developaent (JAPEX) 
POPC 
PIOC 
Nitutshi 1rc,a., 
Mitsui Petrol•m 
Eut UNION (SOX) Attak.a field 
1Cali■1ntan - - - - - (50X) 100,000 b/d 
TOTAL(50X) Bukapai field 
• • • •  (SOX> 55,000 bid 
Develoa:-nt SOCAL 
TEXACO (251) 
Handi l field 
120,000 bid 
ICyuahu Oil July 1967 5.0 Shin NiAJOn Steel South 
Kyushu Sekiyu 1Calti■1ntan 
Kyushu El ec. 
rower 
Tokyo Elec. 
J1p1n Low SUiphur March 1970 3.0 C. ltoh Southwt 
Oi l c .  I .  Energy 
Develop■ent 
Toa Sekiyu Northwest 
Others (12) Java 
TOIW'l ••tian■l lkMllllber 1971 1 .2 South 
Resource Dev. 5'altra 
General Petrol..,. Novellber 1971 0. 71 Gant. Pet. 
DevelOJ,1■1nt 
Vl"ATA (531) 231,000 b/d 
ASNLAIID (15 2/31) (X) 
......
DENIIIEX (15 2/31) 
- - - - (15 2/3S) 
IIATCIIAS & Other1 
- - - - (3.961) 100,000 b/d 
ARCO & Others 
. . • •  (2.581) 
STAWAC (80X) Drttl l ine 
Ton■n Rn. ( 10X) 
Genlt. Pet. Dev. 
(51) 
far East Petroleu1 June 1971 Nt tsui GrCM., far Ea1t Pet. 
Nabi l Oi l (51) 
• • • • 
TABLE 1V·2 (contirued) 
C.  I toh Energy Auguat 1972 1 .8 
Develi.)Jl•nt 
SU11atr• Petroleua May 1973 2.8 
Tc,yo Oi l Develop. February 1973 6.0 
C. I toh 
lapin Ind. 
lri 
World Energy 
Dev. 
Others (2) 
PDPC 
Nitsubiahi 
Pet. Dev. 
PRl)C 
Nissho Jwai 
San••• 8ri 
Maruzen Pet. 
West Jrian 
SUltlltra 
South 
S\aatra 
TREND (271) 
( 10X) 
Others (6) 
(631) 
TOTAL (71.41) 
· • • • (28.6X) 
BOW VALLEY 
(JOI) 
• • • • (251) 
Others (4) 
(28.61) 
100,000 b/d 
(60I ; '"". 
to Japan) 
Dri l l ing 
410 b/d 
Source: Petroly News, Southeast Asia 
Okaaoto (1980) 
Julcagaku Kogyo (1976> 
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Further, the difficulties in developing oil projects necessitated 
cooperation with foreign companies. Although the profit from these 
projects was not large, it could increase more •1 ndependent" sources of 
supplyt. By 1973 the Indonesian Petroleum Development (JAPEX), Japan Low 
Sulphur Oil, and C .  Itoh Energy Development had reached the production 
stage and in 1974 supplies 11 . 6  percent of total Indonesian crude oil 
exports to Japan (FEER, 1975, 88-22�55). Although their share in total 
Japanese oil imports has been small (1.5 I in 1974) , these three 
projects were the major "autonomous" sources among the twelve Japanese 
projects which were on line in 1976. In addition, the Japanese 
government had direct purchase arrangements with the Indonesian 
government and Pertamina. 
In response to an offer by Indonesian President Suharto in 1971 
the Japanese government agreed in 1972 that it would offer the 
Indonesian government 62 billion yen in credit for an oil exploration 
project by Pertamina (PDPC, 1978, p. 25). In return, Pertamina would 
supply 58 million kiloliters of crude oil in total to Japan for ten 
years. In addition to government yen credit Japan Indonesia Oil Co . 
Ltd., was established as an import agent for Pertamina by three Japanese 
electric power companies and four crude oil refiners. The company then 
extended a $100 million loan in 1973 to Pertamina as prepayment for 
crude oil (Mill, 1977, p. 319)o. LNG development projects were also 
granted yen credits by the Japanese government. A 56 billion yen credit 
was extended to the Indonesian government and Pertamina for the 
construction of two LNG plants. The projects themselves were undertaken 
under production-sharing arrangements: the North Sumatra project by 
Nissho Iwaie, Mobil and Pertamina and the East Kalimantan project by 
Nissho Iwafe, Huffington and Pertamina. The contract required 
Pertamina to deliver 7.5 mill ion tons of LNG annually for twenty years, 
with delivery scheduled to begin in 1977 (Morrow, 1975, p. 37). The 
import agent, Japan Indonesia LNG Co. (JILCO)t, was formed in 1974 by 
five consumer companies representing steel, electric power and gas 
companies, sixteen private banks and seven trading companies. JILCO 
- - - -· · .  . . - -- - - - -. 
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also extended a $12 million loan to Pertamina , made available from Japan 
Export-Import Bank (PN, 1976, 7-9 :6) .  
The Japanese government has played an important role in the oil 
and LNG projects in Indonesiae. While most Japanese oil development 
projects in other areas were begun at the beginning of the 1970s , those 
in Indonesia started in the mid 1960s through Japanese governmental 
initiatives (Wu, 1977, pp . 64-65). The low sulphur content of 
Indonesian crude oil had , in the late 1960s, become more attractive to 
an increasingly pollution-conscious Japane. The policy of energy supply 
source diversification away from the Middle East also prompted increased 
Japanese involvement in Indonesia {PN, 1977, 8-2 :e18). The Japanese 
government shared in the risk by participating directly in projects 
through PDPC . Furthermore, government leadership in oil projects 
encouraged the participation of private companiese. The establishment of 
PDPC to encourage private participation, especially in the early 1970s, 
led to the formation of a number of development companies which 
participated in oil exploration and development projects. 
In addition to assisting participating Japanese companies 
financially , the Japanese government offered bilateral aid to the 
Indonesian government and Pertamina. This aid made further oil and LNG 
exploration and development projects possiblee. These types of 
arrangements increased with Pertamina ' s  requests that the Japanese 
finance its exploration and development activities. For example, during 
the period 1973-76 Pertamina invested $197 million in exploration. 
Japan 's  OECF offered loans of approximately $90 million for Pertamina 's  
exploratory activiti es during the same period (PDPC, 1968 , p. 30). 
Including l oans extended by Japanese private corporations Pertamina's 
��� .- � · � ;;;;;7;;:;--!fl;; .;;:.;;a:J*:=.=: ,;;: ===�a · · -- -· --- ·-
9 1  
-•······-· ·-- •· -·•--·-···-·-·--==;;=--!--!======-iiiiiiiii;;;:;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;1111 
reliance on Japanese capital was very substantial.t12 The Japanese 
government took advantage of this leverage to decrease dependence on 
foreign companies and to secure supplies directly from Indonesia 
(lchord, 1976, p. 93). 
Nickel . The first independent nickel project was also realized through 
Indonesia 's  new product-sharing agreements. The Sulawesi Nickel 
Development Corporation (SUNIDECO) was fonned in 1961 by five leading 
Japanese smelters. The Japanese were joined 1n the nickel project in 
Pomala, Sulawasi, by the Indonesian state mineral corporation, P.T. 
Nickel (later P.H. Aneka Tambang)t. The Japanese OECF extended a loan to 
SUNIDECO, as did the Export-Import Bank and other private banks. The 
credits, totaling 486 million yen ($1.t35 million) for the purchase of 
machinery, equipment and service from J�pan, were to be repaid by 
shipping 40S of the production (120,000 tons) to Japan for seven yearst. 
In addition to the repayment the remaining production was to be exported 
. .to Japan, beginning in 1965 (Gibson, 1966, pp. 64-65). 
The repayment of the loan-tied contract mentioned in the last 
paragraph was very favorable to the Japanese partners. The agreement 
specified repayment in a quantity of ore equivalent to the credits and 
interest, but in actual fact the ore ' s  market value was $3 million and 
the Indonesians were credited with a repayment of only $2 million 
(Clark, 1968, p. 71). That is, Japanese smelters could secure nickel 
ore at a lower price than could be achieved through simple market 
purchases. When the seven-year supply agreement lapsed, SUNIDECO joined 
P.N. Aneka Tambang 1n prospecting for additional low-grade nickel 
12. For example, in 1968 Sumitomo Shoji Kaisha and Far East Oil 
Trading, FEO (formed by NOSODECO), offered a loan to Pertamina to 
construct a refinery at Dumai; in 1971 Shinnippon Steel, Tomen 
Trading, Kyushu Oil Development and FEO extended $20 million for 
development of the Jatibarang oil field. The loans were to be repaid 
in crude oil (Arief, 1977, pp. 45-137). 
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reserves on Sulawesi. Furthermore, these five nickel smelters decided 
to construct a ferro-nickel smeltery, near Pomala in South Sulawesi, as 
a joint venture with P.N. Aneka Tambang to reduce ore to nickel at the 
minehead (0£, Dec. 1970, p. 41) .  The annual production was expected to 
be 4,000 tons for export to Japan (Semay, 1972, 8-3: 138). The smeltery 
received a 5, 725 million yen credit for construction from the Japanese 
government as project aid (MITI, 1977, p. 315) .  
In 1969 a joint venture for an exploration and development project 
in the Halmahera Islands was contracted between P.N. Aneka Tambang and 
the Indonesian Nickel Development Co. {INDECO),  which consisted of four 
smelters, one steel company, and three trading companies {See, Table IV-
3). A minimum investment of $74 million and the building of a smelter 
was required for a projected annual production of a 25,000 tons of 
ferro-nickel, which was to be exported to Japan (Kitamura, 1980, p. 
210). In another project three smelters and three trading companies 
have taken part tn a joint venture including P.T. International Nickel 
Indonesia with P.N. Aneka Tambang and INCO. The Japanese companies held 
a 25 percent of capital share and paid approxitmately 3 . 5  billion yen of 
the development cost. This project will supply 12, 000 tons of nickel 
annually to Japan. As a result of these nickel projects, total 
production in Indonesia increased from 137,000 tons in 1961 to 867,300 
tons in 1973 (Palmer, 1978, p. 128) .  
Copper. The only copper project the Japanese participated in was 
Ertsberg copper mine in West Irian, which was undertaken by the U.S.­
based Freeport Minerals Inc. The Japanese participants, five smelters 
and five trading companies, extended a loan for 7.2 billion yen, out of 
· the total development costs of 43.2 billion yent. In return, they were 
, 
TABLE IV·3 
COPPER MD NJDCEL PIOJECTS IN INDONESIA 
Project 
(Area) 
Njckel 
SUl11,eaf 
soroato 
(Sulawes i )  
Nallllher■ 
Yr. of 
Contract 
1962 
1967 
1969 
Type of 
Contract 
Lo■n·related 
(Prodlac:tfon· 
sharing) 
Lo•n·related 
(S■11tting) 
Dev. Stage 
(S■elting) 
Japanese 
Partner, 
SUNIDECO 
(5 1■11lters> 
Shi■ura kako COrp. 
Tokyo Nickel Corp. 
Swait,o■� Corp. 
Mitsui & Co. 
Nislho lwai Co. 
<2SX) 
lndoMstan Nickel 
Dev. Co. 
Nippon Mining Corp. 
SUli tCl■D Net. Nin. 
Taiheiyo Metal Co. 
Nippon Yakin Kogyo 
Ni� Steel 
Nit�iaht Corp. 
SUit ta■ci Corp. 
(751) 
Indoi'les i an 
Partners 
P.N. Aneta 
Ta■beng 
P.T. Intl. Nickel 
lncblesi■ 
P.N. Aneta 
Tlllbang 
INCO (751) 
P.N. Anek■ 
Tlllbeng 
Export• to 
J•pnn (ton/ 
year) 
40X of ore 
production 
(120,000) 
(for 10) 
yrs.)  
12,000 
N.A. 
Dev. 
Costs 
N.A. 
41.6 ■i l .  
yen 
175 
■i l l .  
Cr. and 
Invest. 
by Jap. 
Partn. 
486 
■i l l .  
yen 
( loan) 
3.5 
bi l l .  
yen 
TABLE IV-3 (conti,-,ed) 
Cooper 
Ertsberg 1967 Loan related SUli ta•o Net. Min. 
(West India) Dove Mining COrp. 
Furukawa Nin. Capr. 
Nits�ishi Met. Nin. 
Nippon Mining Co. 
Ni  ttetsu 
Mitsui Ir Co. 
Nits�ishi Corp. 
Nissho lwai Co. 
C. ltah & Co. 
Source: Clark <1968>, Gibson <1966>, tulter (1968), Jukagatu Kogyo (1976). 
Freeport 65·70Xof 43.2 bi l .  7.2 
Indonesia ore prod. yen bitl l .  
(U.S.) (for 15 yen 
yeers) 
Enaineerina a Nfnina Journal. Oriental Econoai st, Pacif ic 
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guaranteed access to about 65-70 % of the ore produced for fi fteen years 
(FEER, 1971, 71-4:59) .t13 
Bauxite. Production under the aegis of P. N. Aneka Tambang has been the 
major source of Japanese imports, espec ially from the Bi ntang Island 
mine. Long-term purchase agreements have prov ided supplies to three 
Japanese smelters throughout the 1960s. 
In the mid 1 970s the Indonesian government's emphasi s  on local 
smelting of bauxite to alumina coincided with the Japanese companies' 
desire to smelt overseas since conversion of bauxite to alumi na i s  
extremely energy-i ntensive.t14  The enormous Asahan Aluminum project 
envi sions the construction of two hydroelectric powerplants on the 
Asahan Ri ver which drains Lake Toba. The power produced by these plants 
will be utilized i n  an aluminum refinery currently under construction 
(1982). The project i s  being undertaken by P . T. Indonesi a  Asahan, as a 
joint venture between the Indonesian government-owned company, and a 
Japanese partner, Japan Asahan Alumitnum, which is itself jointly owned 
by twelve Japanese companies, i ncluding five alumi num refitners.t15 The 
13. It was reported that Japanese companies had attempted to 
acquire the concessi on for thi s  mining project but failed, because 
Freeport Mineral agreed to provide $75 million of the development costs 
and $100 million for i nfrastructure construction (Saito, 1969, p. 27). 
14. Kubota Yutaka (currently the chaitrman of Nippon Koei Co . ,  
Ltd.), who was f irst i nterested i n  the construction of a power stati on 
and aluminum refinery during Japanese occupation in Indonesi a, proposed
the project including a concrete survey after Suharto came to power in 
1967. Until  1974 the project was to be undertaken by a joint Japan-U .S. 
consorti um;  however, U.S. firms dropped out because of di sagreements 
regarding the constructi on of hydroelectri c  power plants (Ni shihara, 
1976, pp. 67-68; R ix, 1980, p. 203). 
15. These companies and their share holdi ngs are: Sumitomo 
Chemical (15%), Sumitomo Shoji Kai sha (51)e, Mitsubishi Chemical (151), 
Mitsub ishi Corp. (5%), Showa Denko (15%), Marubeni Corp. (51) , 
Mitsui Aluminum (15%), Mi tsui & co. (5%), Ni ppon Li ght Metal (5%),
Ni ssho-Iwai (5%), C. Itoh & co . (5%), and Nichimen (5%). 
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financial arrangements for the Asahan complex are unique. The Japanese 
government has di rectly i nvested 34,162.5 million yen through OECF, 
accounting for one-half of total Japanese investments. The companies 
were required to match this sum, and the remaionder, was covered 70% by 
an Export- Import Bank loan and 30% from loans from twenty-three priovate 
banks. In fact, no capiotal was i nvested by the twelve Japanese 
companies. 
Furthermore, i n  1 978 and 1979 the government, through the OECF, 
extended 61, 550 milli on yen i n  cred its to the Indonesi an government for 
the Asahan project i n  the form of development assiostance. In summation ,  
the P. T. Indonesi a  Asahan Alumi num is composed of 75% Japanese capi tal 
and 25% of Indonesian Capi tal (Mill , 1979, p. 184). Furthermore, most 
of the $900 milli on construction cost i s  fi nanced through loans to Japan 
Asahan Alumi num from OECF, the Export-Import Bank , and J ICA (Kiotazawa , 
1 982, p. 48) . Thi s  project has become a "national project" because of 
the massi ve character of Japanese ''economic cooperat ion" with Indonesia 
at the national level (MITI, 1979, pp. 184-187 ). 
However, the purpose of this  project i s  pri marily to secure 
aluminum for the Japanese alum i num i ndustry. The most important factor 
i s  that the enormous quantities of energy to convert bauxite to alumi na 
w ill be generated by cheap hydroelectric power.16 Th is  ensures a less 
costly supply of alumionum from the Asahan refionery i n  case of rapid  
i ncreases in  bauxite pri ces. Further , Japanese i ndustry wi ll- be able to 
i nfluence the i nternational aluminum market by exporti ng aluminum to 
other countri es (Kitazawao, 1982, p. 52). This  project, though termed a 
"national" project, i s  motiovated by corporate i nterests and governmental 
16. P.T. Indonesia  Asahan Aluminum was expected to purchase the 
raw materi al ,  alumi na, from Alcoa Indonesia, wh ich is developing mi nes 
on Kaliomantan Island. However, Alcoa has not yet reached a decision 
concerni ng bauxite production. The alum ina production project in 
Bi ngtang by three Japanese smelters was also shelved i n  1976 because of 
decreased alum i num demand i n  Japan. As a result alumi na for ref in ing 
was to be imported from Australi a (Kiotazawa, 1977, p. 152). 
-----------
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support for the resource industry 's  overseas investments (Ki tazawa, 
1977, p .  152) . 
In summary, Japanese invol vement in mi neral and o i l  ventures in 
Indonesi a  became more active in the late 1960s as Japanese concern for 
secure sources mounted . Indonesia was favored, not only due to i ts rich 
resources , but al so because of its hi storical ly cl ose economic 
rel ationship with Japan . Moreover, the Foreign Investment Law i n  1967 
encouraged increased Japanese corporate i nterest i n  mineral expl oration 
and development .  The Indones i an government actively attracted foreign 
capital by sol iciting tenders and providing i nformati on regardi ng 
potential depos its ( Palmer, 1978, p. 127) . The l arge-scale capital 
requi rements of projects made it imperative for Japanese companies to 
cooperate among themsel ves i n  undertaking projects, sometimes wi th 
foreign capi tal . Consuming industries , such as steel and trading 
companies al so joi ned with smel ters in a· devel opment company formed to 
undertake mi neral projects. The Japanese government , using bi l ateral 
governmental aid to the Indones ian government and fi nancial support for 
projects themselves ,  encouraged pri vate extractive activ i t ies i n  
Indonesi a .  
The Philippines 
The Phi l i ppines has been Japan ' s  second most important suppl i er of 
resources i n  SEA. By 1979, 281 of Japan ' s  total copper i mports 
origi nated in the Phi l i ppines , making it the s ingle l argest suppl ier. 
It al so suppl i ed 161 of nickel imports as their l argest suppl i er (MITI , 
1980, pp . 240-241 ) .  In the l ast ten years espec ial ly, the Ph i l i ppines ' 
importance as a source of these two co111110dities has grown . 17 Thi s  
importance has been reflected i n  i ntensi ty of Japanese extract ive 
activi ties i n  the Ph i l i ppines.  
17 .  In 1970, the Ph i l i ppi nes was a negl igible n i•ckel exporter to 
Japan ; Indonesi a  and New Cal edonia suppl i ed 971 of Japanese n ickel 
imports (See Fi gure 1 1 - 1 ) .  As a copper ore suppl i ers, the Ph i l i ppines 
and Canada have been the two major sources i n  the 1970s . 
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Copper. Japanese involvement in Philippine copper mining has a long 
history. It was the first country in which the Japanese copper mining 
industry sought overseas sources during the 1950s. In 1953 Mitsubishi 
Metal Mining extended a loan to be used for the purchase of a mining 
plant and machinery and as a discounted prepayment for the ore. In 
return, copper ore was supplied from the Rap Rap and Toledo mines, which 
then provided approximately 40% of Japanese ore imports (Nishio, 1968, 
pp. 174-185). In 1954 Mitsui Metal and Mining Co. initiated the first 
joint ventures with Philippine capital (See Table IV-4). The contract 
gave Mitsui prior rights to purchase all products from the mines in 
exchange for technical and financial assistance to the Philippine mining 
company. Until 1959 all foreign equity investment, with the exception 
of U . S. investment, was prohibited by Philippine law. As a result, the 
arrangements had to be in the form of loans, as prepayment or disguised 
as an American investment (Takebayashi, 1963, p. 157). These early 
projects were initiated by individual Japanese mining companies. The 
primary objective was to secure access to the l ower-cost sources to 
supplement insufficient domestically mined ore and to attain a 
competitive advantage over other Japanese mining companies (Horikoshi, 
1971, p. 156) . 
The second copper development boom occurred in the mid 1960s. 
Domestic ore shortages had become severe, creating an urgent need for 
overseas sources of copper ore. The Japanese both increased product in 
operating mines and embarked on joint ventures to explore and develop 
new ore bodies. Leading Japanese copper mining companies increasingly 
entered into joint projects with local mining companies. The existing 
joint ventures were strengthened by increased capital investment. 
In 1970 Mitsubishi Metala, which had had arrangements with the 
Atlas Mining Corporation since the 1950s, purchased a 5% (4 .4 billaion 
yen) share of the company and extended a 7 billaion yen loan to the 
company in exchange for discounts on ore purchases for a twenty year 
� � 
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period beginning in 1971. Dowa Mining Corp. and Marubeni Corp. 
entered into an exploration project with the Philippine company CPPC 
which was to reach the development stage in 1976. In 1969, Nippon 
Mining and C. Itoh & Co. contracted with Batong Buhay Mining Corporation 
for a joint project in the Manila area; in this case the Japanese 
partners extended a $2 million loan for financial and technical aid. In 
1971 Nippon Mining and Mitsubishi Corp., entered a joint exploration 
venture with a 401. share-holding in a project in the Manila area with 
Dizon Copper Silver Mines, Inc., a Philippine company (Ajia Doko 
Nenpo, 1972). Similar exploration and development projects were under 
way in the first half of the 1970s (See Table IV-4)t. 
The pattern of contracted projects was that Japanese companies 
extended loans to local Philippine companies for development costs 
and/or joint development ventures through equity participation. In many 
cases, the Japanese partner consisted of a mining company and a trading 
company which had not participated in copper projects during the 1950s. 
There was increasing equity participation in the early 1970s, but the 
bulk of the projects in production were loan-related joint projects. 
Almost all ore production was shipped to the Japanese partner 's smelters 
as loan repayments. 
Nickelt. Nickel is the second largest metal foreign exchange earner for 
the Philippines. Japanese companies, although less active than in 
copper, began to participate in nickel extraction in the late 1960s. 
Japanese investment by the Sumitomo Metal Mining Co., Ltd. and Marubeni 
Corp. in Marinduque Mining and Industrial Corp. was one of the earliest 
cases of Japanese joint nickel projects in the Philippines (Tsuda, 1978, 
p. 27) .  MITI supplied $55 million in supplier 's  credits for the 
purchase of machinery and equipment for this joint project in Surigao, 
Nonoc Island. (PNJ, Jan. 1970, p. 32). Another project in Palawan 
conducted by the Rio Tuba Nickel Mining Corp. is also a Philippine­
Japanese joint venture. The leading Japanese shareholders, who owned a 
total of 40� of the equity, include a nickel smelter (Taiheiyo Metal 
Corp.), steel companies (Nippon Steel and Nisshin Steel) and a trading 
• 
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company (Nissho Iwai ) .  Mine development costs of 8.a2 billion yen were 
largely borne by the Japanese partners (Radke, 1980, p. 49) . In 
exchange, all the ore, one million tons yearly, was to be shipped to 
Japan for a ten year period co111nencing in 1976a. This project was 
provided a long-term loan through the Japanese Export-Import Bank and 
JICAa. The two other projects conducted through joint ventures bet�een 
Japanese groups and Philippine companies were in the predevelopment or 
in exploration stage in 1976 (Jukagaku Kogyo, 1976, p.  219). 
Japanese joint venture investment in Philippine mining by 1976, 
totaled approximately 1,467 . 7  million pesos, or 31. 4% of cumulative 
Japanese investment in all Philippine joint ventures. Fourteen joint 
ventures were engaged in mining, of which ten were large-scale (Tsuda, 
1978, pp . 21-28). The relatively large amount of activity in mining 
enterprises after the mid 1960s is explained primarily by a great demand 
for minerals and Japan's geographical proximity to the Philippines, 
which lowers transport costs. Japan has been and is receiving over 80% 
of Philippine mineral exportsa. 
Philippine government policy has striven to facilitate foreign 
investment. The most important expression of this policy was the 
Investment Incentives Act in 1967 which provided tax exemptions on 
imported plant and machinery facilities and other equipment necessary 
for the initial year of a mining projecta. This law also exempted 
projects from all taxes except the income tax. Foreign investment was 
allowed to total 401 equity participation (Kitamura, 1980, p. 219). As 
a result, approved foreign investment in mining (equity and non-equity 
financing) accounted for 1, 229 million pesos or 39.a25% of total foreign 
investment between 1968 and 1974. Foreign financing was largely non­
equity, that is, in the form of loans and credits for machinery, 
equipment, and technical assistance, accounting for 99 . 9% of total 
financing in the mining sector (Jurado, 1976, pp. 310-313). 
Unlike Indonesia, where the state has decisive power over mineral 
extraction, the Philippine participants in mining are all private 
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companies. Foreign investors are allowed to control up to 40f. of total 
equity, but the average foreign investment share has remained lower.a18 
As a result, Japanese private companies have dealt directly with 
Philippine investors, who have welcomed Japanese capital participation. 
Japanese copper companies, with longer project experience in the 
Philippines than in other countries, have had greater opportunities to 
continue existing projects and embark on new projects with domestic 
Philippine capital.a19 An important Japanese advantage is the readiness 
to prefinance new projects with loans granted for the purchase of 
machinery and for technical assistance. This was desirable to 
Philippine partners because of their lack of financial and technical 
capabilities (Wang, 1978,. p. 249). Furthermore, Japanese companies, 
which were more concerned with ensuring stable supplies than price, 
offered favorable contractual terms.a20 This has encouraged continued 
interest among Philippine companies in fixed con111itments with Japanese 
companies (Radke, 1980, p. 38). 
Under these favorable conditions, Japanese companies have been 
successful in obtaining access to "captive" sources of supply. The 
increasing capital requirements have prompted mining, trading and 
consuming companies to coordinate their efforts in nickel mining 
18. On the average, 261 of the equity in the Phi l ippine mining 
corporations is in foreign hands (in 1980). The bulk of the foreign 
investment in mining has been in copper mining (Radke, 1980, pp. 58-59). 
19. The Philippine-Japanese joint mining ventures have frequentl y 
been composed of •groups" of exclusive industrialists, linked by
familiar relationships. Many of the mining companies, especially 
copper, are owned by these groups. For example, Atlas Consolidated, 
which is owned by the Soriano family is a Mitsubishi Metal Corp.
affiliate; Marinduque Mining Industrial Corp. is owned by the Elizalde 
family and is a Mitsui Metal Mining Corp. affiliate. These family
relationships provide opportunities for Japanese companies to gain 
access to new projects in conjunction with the same family companies 
(Kiatamura, 1980, p. 218; Tsuda, 1978, pp. 101-107). 
20. In 1978 prices Japanese companies paid to the Philippine
companies were 4.a7 cents/pound above the world market price (Radke, 
1980, p. 3). 
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ventures. Extending loans and supplier's credit for the purchase of 
machinery, facilities, and technical assistance is an important 
corporate tool in acquiring ore supplies. In comparison to Indonesia, 
the Japanese government' s  direct involvement has been limited in the 
Philippines. This is partially because, historically , the United States 
has maintained closer economic and political ties with the Philippines. 
In addition there is lingering anti-Japanese animosity due to Japant' s  
WWII occupation of the Philippines . These two factors had prevented the 
Japanese government from pursuing active economic policies, with the 
exception of reparation payments, until the late 1960s. In the 
Philippines, it was private Japanese companies that initiated resource 
extractive activities. The Japanese government, howevert, has extended 
financial assistance to a few projectst. This financial assistance began 
in the late 1960s, through either the Export-Import Bank or the 
governmental agencies, JICA and OECF. 
Malaysia 
Japanese mining and oil activities in Maltaysia have been limited, 
although recently the Japanese have begun to secure access to copper, 
petroleum, and natural gas depositst. Malaysia has been Japan's major 
tin supplier (57.9% in 1979). But the relative insignificance of tin as 
an industrial metal has prompted a lack of interest among Japanese 
regarding this metal , when compared to other non-ferrous minerals (Mill, 
1980, pp. 240-241).Zl The dominance of British, Australian and 
Malaysian capital in the Malaysian tin industry has prevented Japanese 
2 1. Malaysia also had been a major iron ore supplier to Japan, as 
had India and the Philippines. For example , in 1958, 31% of total 
Japanese iron ore imports was from Malaysia. However, by 1970 
Malaysiat' s  share had decreased to about 5% as Australia, India, and 
Brazil became major iron ore exporters to Japan (Wakiyama, 1967, p. 10). 
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capietal from enter ing the industry with the excepti on of some small 
Japanese-Malaysian joi nt ventures (PIN, 1973, 4-5 : 90-100).e22 
Petroleum. Japanese oil exploration in Sabah began early in  the hiestory 
of Japanese oil development projects . In 1964 with the financial 
assiestance of the PDPC ( 56.3% of the total capital invested} the Teikoku 
Oil Co. obtained a concession and fomed, with Marubeni Corp. and two 
other compan ies, the Sabah Teieseki Oil Co. ( Sabah Oil Development Co.). 
As an i ndependent company it  has been engaged i n  drilli ng throughout the 
State of Sabah in North Borneo. The other oil project was the Sabah 
Marine Area Co., formed in  1969, and comprised of the PDPC (45 .6% of 
Japanese i nvestment}, the Tei koku Oil Co. and the Sumietomo Group; the 
other partner was the French-based SNPA. The Northeastern Sabah oil 
field that was discovered produced 500 b/d of oil i n  1976 . However, 
this  field,s production was not commercially feasible. 
Oil production in Malaysi a  has increased rapidly over the last ten 
years. Malaysia  exports low sulphur crude and imports less expensive, 
low qual ity Iran ian and Kuwai ti crude for domestic usee. The share of 
crude o il  i n  total Malaysian exports increased from less than one 
percent i n  1971 to 23. 7 percent i n  1977. After the m i d  1970s it  became 
the second most i mportant export commodi ty, trailing only timber. In 
the 1980s, o il  is  expected to be the country ' s  largest foreign exchange 
earner (PN, 1980, 10-12 :20-21)e. The Malaysian government formed 
PETRONAS, the state o il  company , in  1974 under the Petroleum Development 
22. The Pacific Industri al & Min ing Co. , a joint venture of a 
Japanese group w ith 25% of in itial paid-i n  capi tal and Malaysian capital 
began tin dredging in  Perak state, with Japanese-supplied equiepment in  
1969. On the other hand, Orie ntal Tin Smelters, Ltd. controlled by 
Ishihara Sangyo Kaisha was forced to close down in  1969. Thi s  was 
because the Br itish controlled tin mienes and Chienese-Malay gravel pump 
mienes which had standing arrangements with Br itish and Chienese smelters 
refused to sell concentrations to the Japanese smelter (PIN, 1973, 4 -5 :  
99). 
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Act, and simultaneously tightened state control over oil development. 
As a result , existing concession arrangements with Japanese companies 
were revised to a production-sharing system (Malaysia, 1981, p. 14). 
Though involvement is uncertain, the Japanese continue to display 
interest. For example, C. Itoh & Co. has undertaken the Master Plan 
design for the development of the country's oil and gas resources for 
PETRONAS. This study was financed by a loan for research projects to 
PETRONAS from JICA (Japan International Cooperation Agency) (PN, 1976, 
7-8: 11-12; MITI, 1977, p. 339). 
Natural gas. Exploration and development (for liquefaction and export) 
has also been under the control of PETRONAS. The Mitsubishi Corporation 
organized the LNG development project set up in 1975 in Sarawak, with a 
17.a5% equity. This is a joint venture with Royal Dutch Shell (17.a5%) 
and PETRONAS (65%). The LNG production of 6 million tons annually is to 
be exported to Japan. The Japanese government is providing 21 million 
yen credit as part of its fifth yen credit package to Malaysia to help 
finance the construction of a new port at Bintulu where the LNG terminal 
is being built (PN, 1978, 9-2:a13-15). 
Bauxite. Malaysian bauxite exports to Japan are mainly from two sources 
and supplied approximately 19% of Japanese imports in 1974. The most 
important source is Ramunia Bauxite Ltd. (local capital) which exports 
801 (300 , 000 tons) of total production at prevailing market prices. The 
other source is a joint venture of Japan Light Metal Co. (25%) and ALCAN 
( 50%) . This project was started in 1957 by ALCAN' s  subsidiary, 
Southeast Asia Bauxite (SEABA), and joined by Japan Light Metal in 1960 
( Sakata ,  1969, pp. 233-273) . The project was not begun at the behest of 
Japanese smelters; rather, the Japanese were drawn in. Japan Light 
Metal seems to have entered this arrangement earlier than other smelters 
due to its prior capital affiliation with ALCAN. 
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Copper, The first of the large-scale Japanese copper mining projects in 
Malaysia started in 1969 at the Mamut Copper Mine in Sabah. The 
concession, which was prospected by a United Nations survey team, was 
acquired in international bidding by Overseas Mineral Resource 
Development (OMRO) (Kaigai Kobutsu Shigen Kaihatsu) , a joint venture 
of the Japanese government and seven copper companies.23 On the basis 
of this concession, five copper mining companies formed Mamut Mine 
Development Co. This company joined with the local government of the 
State of Sabah to form OMRP Sabah, a development company, which was 
financed by the two partners on equal terms (Of, Dec. 1970, p .  41 ) .  The 
development cost has been estimated to be 29. 4  billion yen, of which, 
the Japanese provided 27.6 billion yen. The mine and associated 
refinery produces 40, 000 tons of copper ingots, all of which is exported 
to Japan , and earned $50 million of foreign exchange for Sabah in 1978 
(Wang , 1978, p. 189). 24 This project and the Musoshi mine in Zaire have 
been two of the largest copper projects in which the Japanese have 
participated.25 
The number of Japanese mineral and oil projects is smaller in 
Malaysia than in Indonesia or the Philippinest. These projects were 
begun in the mid 1960s, relatively late in the Japanese drive for 
resource independence (this excludes bauxite mining which began 
earlier). As a result, the types of projects reflect latter Japanese 
government policies preferring "autonomous development" through capital 
investment. This preference is embodied in the Mamut Copper project and 
the various oil projects. As with other oil projectst, PDPC participated 
through the provision of nearly half of the capital requirements. In 
23. The seven mining companies are Mitsubishi Metal, Mitsui Metal 
Mining, Sumitomo Metal Mining, Dowa Miningt, Nippon Mining, Furukawa 
Miningt, and Nittetsu Mining. 
24. This project, however, created an environmental problem.
Environmental destruction by the Mamut copper includes river pollution 
and paddy destruction, and caused disputes between local residents and 
the company (Matsui, 1979) . 
25. The copper mining project in Zaire is also operated by OMROt. 
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the LNG project, the Japanese government extended both ODA and yen 
cred its to the state oi l and gas company. The Mamut Copper project was 
undertaken by a government-organized group of mining compani es. 
Clearly, the Japanese government's role i n  encouragi ng and fosteri ng 
mineral-related actiavities i n  Malaysia has been very i mportant. 
Thailand 
Thailand i s  the third largest source of tin for Japan and supplies 
approxi mately 20S of Japan ' s  total tin i mports. Few Japanese companies 
are i nvolved i n  thi s i ndustry, however, as tin i s  not consiadered 
i ndustri ally si gni fiacant. Japanese do partici pate i n  joi nt ventures 
with Thai capital to mi ne other mianerals, notably fluori te and 
26manganese.a However, Japanese mianeral industries have not launched any 
large-scale mining projects. 
In the early 1970s, three groups began oi l exploration and 
development projects. In 1969, w ith 13.3% of the financi ng from PDPC, 
the Mi tsui group formed the Miatsui Oi l Development Co. , which entered an 
equal partnershi p w ith CONOCO. The Southeast Asiaan Petroleum Co.a, 
establiashed i n  1971 by PDPC with 40.9% of Japanese capiatal and three 
Japanese refianers, Maruzen Sekiyu, Niappon Kogyo, and Dai kyo 
Sekiyu,a27 contriabuted 20% to a joint venture wiath Uni on Oil. The only 
other project was an equal partnership between AMOCO (50%)a, PDPC 
(37. 5%) , and Idemitsu Kosan, an i ndependent Japanese refianer, formi ng 
the Idemiatsu Thai Oi l Development Co. i n  1972. Drilli ng i s  under way in 
all of these projects, but only a few wells have produced a small 
quanti ty of oil, and these have not yet reached producti on stage. The 
26. In fluori te mining the Thai Resources Development Co. had 
69.61 capiatal partici patiaon by Toho Sangyo; i n  manganese mining 
Natiaonal Thai Co. Ltd. was 51% i n  Thai and 49% Japanese. These are two 
of the on-goiang joi nt mining projects (Thaialand, BOI, 1976; Shukan 
Toyo Keiza i ,  1980, p. 128).  
27. These three refiners are non-foreign affiliated oi l 
compani es. 
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Mitsui Development group, however, has discovered promising quantities 
of natural gas in 1980 (Murakami, 1980, p. 183).  It is notable that 
independent Japanese oil refiners took part in exploration projects with 
PDPC financial assistance, a new development. 
Burma 
The Peoplet' s  Oil Industry is the national Burmese oil company, 
created by the government after the nationalization of the Burmese oil 
system in 1963 to undertake on-shore exploration and development without 
foreign participation.t28 The stated aim of the oil company was to 
achieve national self-sufficiency in oil. By the early 1970s, seven 
major oil fields had been developed and reached a production level of 
40,t000 barrels a day in total (FEER, 25 June 1976, p. 84). As a result, 
output of petroleum products experienced modest gains and since 1970, 
has been exporting small quantities of naptha, mainly to Japan (PN, 
1973 , 4 -4: 17). In this period Japan had no opportunities to become 
directly involved in oil projects. The Burmese obtained technical and 
financial assistance for its oil development from socialist countries 
(Arumugam, 1977, p. 30).  
In 1970 the Peoplet' s  Oil Industry was reorganized to fom the 
Myama Oil Corporation (MOC).  The MOC became interested in the 
possibility of exploring Burma ' s  offshore potential, but this required 
Western and Japanese assistance (PN, 1972 , 3-4 : 19).  As a result, 
between 1970 and 1972, surveys were conducted or sponsored by Western 
and Japanese oil companies. The Japanese Petroleum Resource Development 
Co. undertook a 3100 square mile geophysical survey of the Gulf of 
Martaban region, near the mouth of the Irrawaddy River (PIN, 1972, 3-
28. In 1947 the British companies, Burma Oil, lndo-Burma Oil, 
British Burma resumed import service and restored the oil fields. The 
Burmese government participated in the oil industry and reorganized the 
oil companies into one joint company, Burma Oil, in 1954 (Murakami,
1980, pp. 54-58) . 
1 10 
292 :88)e.e The Japanese government, through OECF, extended a 3,600 
mi l l eion yen l oan i n  1971 and another in 1973 of 3,080 mi l l i on yen i n  
yen-credi ts to the Burmese government to fund the survey (MITI, 1977, p. 
383 ) .  
In 1974, Burmese oi l  pol icy changed sharply and the MOC awarded 
four productieon-sharing arrangements to foreign o i l  compani es30; one of 
which was to the Arakan Develeopment Company, comprised of PDPC, the 
Japan Petroleum Resource Develeopment Corporatieon, Kyodo Oiel ,  
Mitsubi shi Petroleum Development Company, and Mi tsui Petroleum 
Develeopment Company (Jukagaku-Kogyo, 1976, p.  95) . 31  The pol i cy 
shi ft al low ing foreign companies to participate in the expl oration for 
o i l  was a signif icant modification of Burmese socialeist economi c  
poleicies.e32 However, on-shore o i l  production and development has 
conti nued to be control l ed by MOC (Arumugam, 1977, p. 32). 
In addition to financial assiestance for projects in which Japanese 
companies took part, i n  1977 the Japanese government extended a 29,950 
m i l l i on yen credit through OECF to the Bumese for the construction of 
the Mann Refinery. Furthermore, in 1973 and 1974, Japan ' s  MMDPC and 
29 .  The other Western companies were Gulef Oi l ,  Amoco, and Prakle, 
a German firm. 
30 . The other three groups were an Ameri can group compris ing 
Cities Service, Burma Sun Oi l and Robi na Oi l Company; a group composed 
by CFP, Demienex and AGP; and the Essa Expleorat ion and Producti on of 
Burma group (PN, 1974, 5-10: 52). 
31. Under Burma's productieon-sharing contracts, the state is the 
only owner of petroleum resources and companies serve as contractors to 
the MOC for expl orati on and production .  If production occurs, the 
contractor i s  al l owed to recover i ts expendietures from sales to a 
maximum of 401. Product-sharing of profit after cost recovery is on the 
rati o  of 70 :30 in favor of MOC (PN, 1974, 5-10 : 52). 
32. Since 1974 the Burmese government has adopted a more 
"develeopment -oriented" pol icy rather than the former ''selef-rel iant'' 
poleicy, which had been in effect si nce 1962 . As a result, the country 
was more open to forei gn aid, alethough the government has attempted to 
remai n  neutral (Kieryu, 1982). 
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JICA conducted resource develaopment studiaes as wel l as a regiaonal 
develaopment project i n  the Moniawa area under the auspi ces of the 
governmental techni cal assiastance program (Mill, 1975a, p. 400). Si nce 
1970, when oi l i mports from Burma began, Japan has di spl ayed more 
i nterest i n  Burma's resource potenti al . Burma received 3. 6� of Japanese 
ODA, high compared to other develaoping countries, wi th the excepti on of 
other Southeast Asian countriaes. Japan contriabuted 30.a41 of the total 
aid Burma recei ved i n  1976 from al l i ndustrial i zed countries, and has 
been the chief donor of economic  aid to Burma. Al though i mportation of 
. oi l and mi neral s from Burma has been l i mited thus far, bi l ateral aid has 
the potenti al to become an effecti ve pol icy tool i n  obtai ning access to 
Burma' s  resources. 
In sunrnary, thias chapter has provi ded a case study of the way i n  
which Japanese resource pol icy was conducted i n  SEA. The speci fi c 
projects i l l austrate the changi ng polaicies which Japanese compani es have 
used to ensure thei r access to oi l and mi neral suppl i es. The use of 
hi stori cal anal ysis  has enabl ed a di fferenti ation of the types of 
Japanese i nvolavement. 
Japanese i ndustri es partici pated more acti vel y i n  the projects 
after the mid 1960s . The extension of l oans or equity participatiaon has 
been an i mportant tacti c for Japanese compani es desi ring to ensure 
access and establai sh greater control over mianeral sources. The 
acquiasition of oi l through productiaon-shari ng i n  Indonesi a  and l oan-tied 
purchases of copper and ni ckel i n  the Phi l i ppi nes and Indonesi a  are good 
examplaes of l oan-tied procurement. The risk and l arge capi tal 
requiarements that accompanied l arge-scal e projects made i t  necessary for 
Japanese companiaes to partici pate i n  groups. These groups i nclauded not 
onl y mianeral and oi l i ndustries, but alaso trading and consumer 
compani es. 
· In addi ti on to these pri vate activi ti es, the Japanese government 
encouraged and someti mes even i nit iated projects . The major pol icy tool 
i n  the case of oil  and mi neral devel opment was fianancial and techni cal 
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assistance to the projects through the Export-Import Bank, OECF, JICA, 
and PDPC. SUNIDECO in Indonesia, the nickel project in the Phil i ppines , 
and many of the oil projects, exemplified this governmental supporte. 
The Japanese government 's  role in organizing and initiating private 
corporations through PDPC or OMRO was an important factor in spreading 
costs and risks, thereby inducing companies to embark on new projectse. 
Moreover, bilateral aid to the producer countries, such as the yen 
credits extended for the LNG projects in Malaysia and Indonesia and the 
oil development projects in Indonesia, smoothed the way for the private 
•compan1es. 
Finally, increased Japanese participation in SEA reflects changes 
in the respective producer countries. Whether local partners were state 
companies or private companies, they were willing to allow Japanese 
capital to develop resource holdings and productione. In each case, the 
producer country governments have allowed this to satisfy foreign 
exchange needs . The Japanese have offered favorable contractural terms, 
including prefinancing for mines and oil fields, and loans for the 
purchase of goods and services ,  to be repaid w ith ore or crude oil. 
These provisions have been welcomed by producer countries which are 
short of capital and technologye. This dependence on Japanese foreign 
investment assistance and the Japanese market for exports has furthered 
Japanese policies of securing access to raw material suppleies. 
CONCLUSION 
Is current Japanese resource policy the result of a completely new 
government foreign economic policy begun in the 1970s? Or is it a 
natural outgrowth of past commercial activities? This study of Japanese 
resource policies suggests that there has been a conscious and serious 
effort by the Japanese government and private corporations over, at 
least, the last fifteen years to free themselves from foreign control of 
vital resources. These policies were neither the products solely of the 
government nor of private corporations, but a result of the integrated 
policies of both. While some have argued that Japan had no resource 
policy until the oil crisis, this paper has demonstrated that resource 
policies were developed prior to the oil cr�sis. It has detailed the 
process of resource policy development by identifying the participants 
and their strategies. 
The study demonstrates that the significant factor in policy 
evolution was the Japanese government which determined the orientation 
and implementation of policies. This government involvement reflected 
the close relations between the government and the private corporations 
that participated in resource extraction. The argument that Japan is a 
resource-scarce country dependent on foreign sources and vulnerable to 
potential fluctuations of resource supply is not sufficient. This 
vulnerability does not completely explain why and how the Japanese 
government and companies became more active in independent resource 
policies during the 1960s. While it is true that Japan has been 
vulnerable, the nature of the reactions to this fact are unexplained. 
The most interesting question is when and why this vulnerability or 
perception of vulnerability prompted government officials and corporate 
executives to adopt a more conscious, active resource policy. 
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Economic growth based on heavy industrialization, which Japanese 
government and industry chose as a path to pursue for economic 
develtopment, increased dependence on foreign sources in the 1960s. 
Rapid increases in industrial use of resources increased demand and 
consequently forced an increase in resource imports . Japan was 
dependent on a smal l number of producers, many of which were develtoping 
countries. These factors concerning Japanese suppl y and consumption 
increased uncertainty regarding the future avail ability of adequate 
supplties of raw material s. 
Furthermore, unltike the international oil or mineral corporations 
based in the Western countries, traditional Japanese oil and mineral 
industries were relatively uninvol ved in actual mining activities such 
as expltoration, develtopment and mine production. Most Japanese mineral 
and oil companies were not integrated from the mine to final product, 
but engaged onl y in refining and sales. This unintegrated structure, 
due partial ly  to a l ack of domestic sources and partial ly  to their weak 
competitive position relative to the international mineral companies, 
ensured the Japanese industry ' s  weakness and inability to embark on 
overseas resource develtopment. 
In the 1960s concern regarding the predictabil ity of stabl e and 
low-cost supplies of natural resources became more pronounced due to 
i ncreasing dependence and weak industrial structure. In addition to 
these characteristics specific to Japan, develtopment in the 
international resource economy heightened these concerns . The overal l 
shift from over-production to resource shortages, market fluctuations 
due to strikes and international politics, and the creation of producer 
cartel s deepened uncertainty and concern. For both the government, 
especial l y  MITI, and industry the suppl y shortages or price hikes woul d 
be disastroust. They understood that a stabl e and inexpensive resource 
suppl y was indispensabl e not only for the continuous operation of 
Japanese industry, but al so to ensure international competitiveness. 
Resources have been and remain a necessary prerequitsite for a healthy 
economy. 
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The undeveloped condition of the Japanese resource industries 
prompted the government, through MITI, to launch an active policy to 
secure supplies. Heightened concern among officials, as seen in 
official documents, resulted in the adoption of measures implementing 
more independent policies in the mid 1960s. The extractive industries 
were unprepared financially, technically, and managerially for overseas 
resource-related activities. Therefore, MITI was required to supplement 
these deficiencies through various measures. One measure was to provide 
financial and technical assistance to companies engaged in overseas 
resource projects. To fulfill this function existing government 
agencies, such as the Export- Import Bank, OECF, and JICA, and newly 
established or reorganized ones such as the POPC and MMDPC were utilized 
to ensure the implementation of Mill's policies. The obstacles to 
overseas resource projects, such as high risk and large capital 
requirements, were, in part, borne by the government. In this way the 
government increased opportunities for extractive companies to 
participate in overseas projects. 
In addition to assistance, Mill organized private companies into 
consortia through semi-governmental corporations such as the Overseas 
Mineral Resource Development Corp. and the Overseas Petroleum Resource 
Development Corp. , and MITI took the initiative in encouraging the 
involvement of a number of extractive companies in resource projects . 
The consortia method was very effective in overcoming the relative 
weakness of individual corporations. 
Bilateral government aid was used to support mineral and oil 
exploration and development projects by private companies. As was 
frequently the case in Southeast Asia, economic aid, in the form of yen 
credits or technical assistance to the producing governments, was tied 
to securing access to resource projects and supplies. To compete with 
large international corporations, which had enormous financial 
capabilities, not only for mineral exploration and development but also 
for infrastructure construction, the Japanese government extended 
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assistance to producing countries to complement private extractive 
activities. 
The geographical distribution of governmental aid in SEA coincides 
very closely with resource extraction projects. Government policy tools 
were extremely effective in encouraging and supporting overseas resource 
development by the late-comer Japanese companies. Government guidance 
and patronage prompted private extractive industries to become more 
active in their overseas ventures. Not only traditional mineral 
companies, but non-foreign-affiliated oil companies, trading companies 
and consumer industries also became more involved in mineral-related 
activities. Given MITI's various blandishments and Japan' s  growing 
economic strength in capital and technology, these companies initiated 
more active resource projects after the mid 1960s. 
There are three types of resource contracts :  simple market 
purchase, loan-related purchases and "autonomous" development. As a 
more active resource policy evolved, the relative weight of these three 
contract patterns changed. Although the simplae purchases pattern has 
been dominant throughout the post-war period, the second and the third 
types were more activelay pursued by the government and extractive 
companies after the mid 1960s. This shift reflected policy developments 
on the part of both the government and the corporations. 
In the 1950s resource policy was domestic-oriented and very few 
projects were l aunched through l oan-tied contracts or equity 
participation, also termed "autonomous" development. In the mid 1960s 
when policy became more overseas-oriented, the use of loan-tied and 
"autonomous" types of contracts became more frequent. This trend was 
noticeable in copper , nickel and oil ventures in Southeast Asiaa. 
Japanese government policy, particularly that of MITI, was the 
most important factor in post-war Japanese resource policy in 
coordination with private corporations. This close working relationship 
between the government and the extractive companies functioned through 
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institutional arrangements and supportive measures characteristic of 
industry-government interaction. This paper does not argue that such 
industry-government cooperation or cooperation between the various 
government institutions, such as MITI and the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (MFA) was total or that the evolution of these policiesa· was 
smooth. In the case of the Tyumen oil project in the Soviet Union, for 
examplae, the Japanese government refused to participate due to 
international polaitical considerations (Curtis, 1977). The MFA has 
warned that the independent initiatives to acquire resources coul d cause 
friction with the Western industrial countries (MFA, 1972). Some 
observers have argued that there has been rivalry among politicians and 
industrialists over specific resource development projects, such as 
those in Indonesia (Kitazawa, 1982, pp. 3 1-32, pp. 43-44) . Yet there 
was l ittle disagreement on the basic thrust of the general resource 
policy. Even given these reservations, the general evolution of 
resource polaicy can still be best explaained by an examination of the 
governmenta' s  rolae and its claose relaationship with the affected 
industries. 
The evolaution of resource polaicies suggests that international 
factors conditioned pol icy development. The rapid growth of the 
Japanese economy and its internationalization transformed relataionships 
with producer countries. The Japanese government and companies 
developed to where they could mobilaize capital for aid and foreign 
investment in producer countries. Secondly, the relative power of the 
international mineral and oil companies eroded as producer countries or 
indigenous producer companies exerted increased sovereignty over 
resource extraction activities. This offered greater opportunities for 
Japanese companies to initiate and operate extractive projects. Usual l y  
the l ocal partners in producing countries needed the capital and 
technology which the Japanese partners could provide. The producer 
country' s policies of introducing direct foreign investment in the 
mining and oil sector also presented favorable conditions for the 
Japanese. 
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Although Japan is still dependent for the bulk of its resource 
imports on simple purchases from foreign sourcest, this does not mean 
there has been no Japanese resource policy. In fact, the Japanese 
government and private corporations attempted to manage this dependence 
on foreign resources in order to lessen potential vulnerability. For 
example, by the early 1970s the Japanese government and private 
companies had launched a variety of oil, LNG and mineral projects in 
Indonesia, Malaysia and Philippines. In Thailand and Burma, Japanese 
had initiated a limited number of oil projects. As there has been a 
time lag between the planning stage and actual contract or operational 
stage, the exact starting points of each project have often been 
unclear. However , the resource projects in SEA indicate that, for the 
most part, Japanese resource policy has been carefully devised and 
implemented by both the Japanese government (MITI) and private companies 
during the 1960s. The policies were responding not to the pressure of 
single events but rather to the pressure of domestic concerns regarding 
resource dependence and changes in the international resource situation. 
Unlike the governments and multinational corporations of the Western 
industrial countries ,  the aim of the Japanese government and the 
extractive corporations was primarily to secure resources ,  not to 
extract cheap resources. The coalition between the government and the 
private sector was a decisive factor in the evolution of Japanese 
resource policy in pursuit of this goal. 
This study is. not exhaustive of all the questions relating to 
Japanese resource policy. Areas of further study to elucidate other 
issues in understanding Japanese resource policy include the following: 
First, Japanese resource policy must be studied on a world-wide basis, 
including both developed and developing countries. Second, future 
research should include the post-1973 Oil Crisis period. The Oil Cris i s  
certainly had an impact on resource policy , with 1nore frequent 
cooperation with foreign mineral and oil companies in the post-oil 
crisis period and lessened industry reliance on governmental support. 
Furthermore, as the scale of projects grew so did the risk. Thi s  
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increased risk has made agreements between the government and prievate 
corporati ons and between partner companies more di ffi cul t. 
Thirdl y,  though this study focused on Japanese resource pol icy, 
further research relating to producer country poleicies and economic 
devel opment pl ans i s  needed. Whi l e  relations between devel oped and 
developing countries are asymmetric ,  the goals of the producer countri es 
cannot be i gnored. Producer countries increasingly prefer smel ting 
minerals to simply exporting ore. This pol icy of moving downstream in 
the production process has changed Japanese procurement patterns and 
forced a change in the Japanese domestic  industrial structure. A final 
topic for future research is to analyze the i mpact of Japanese resource 
pol icy on the producing countr ies' soc iety as wel l as economy. The 
future relationship  between Japan and the producer countri es whi ch w i ll  
detemine Japanese resource pol icy is defined by the i mpact of present 
pol icy on the economy of the producer country. 
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